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Two elements of the Clean Air Act are viewed as essential to 
its many successes: the health-based national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQS), which restrict emissions of six 
widely released air pollutants, and the statute’s hybrid form of 
cooperative federal-state regulation. This Article will show that 
these programs are far less important to the operation of the 
statute than conventional wisdom would have you believe. An 
amalgam of parallel programs and external constraints, both 
political and practical, have marginalized the NAAQS 
framework and limited state action, such that in practice the law 
is more federal than it is cooperative. 
Theories of environmental federalism have reinforced these 
misperceptions by focusing unduly on regulatory pathologies 
associated with large corporations (e.g., interstate regulatory 
races to the bottom, agency capture). While industrial sources 
are undoubtedly important, air pollution in the United States is 
largely a collective problem for which the number of sources 
matters more than their size. Environmental Protection Agency 
data show that urban density is the principal reason that almost 
50 percent of Americans live in areas that fail to meet one or 
more NAAQS. The prevailing focus on emissions from large 
industrial facilities is misleading because it obscures many of the 
most important sources of air pollution and, perhaps more 
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importantly, because it causes academics and policymakers to 
make assumptions about the political economy of clean air 
regulation that do not apply to the small, diffuse sources that 
account for most air pollution nationally. 
Recognizing the structural limits and inconsistencies of clean 
air policy opens up significant opportunities for reform. First, 
EPA could be given the authority to set NAAQS compliance 
deadlines and to condition approval of state plans on adoption of 
specific programs. These reforms would refocus the planning 
process from meeting narrow bureaucratic ends to developing 
innovative programs and setting transparent compliance 
schedules. Second, federal regulation of major industrial sources 
skews regulatory priorities and unnecessarily limits state 
authority to select policies and allocate emissions across sources. 
I will argue that the two programs could be eliminated as part of 
compromise legislation to achieve broader reforms on issues such 
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A vast literature exists on environmental federalism 
examining the appropriate balance of regulatory authority 
between the federal government and the states. The power of 
concentrated business interests to pressure government officials 
into relaxing environmental standards has long been a central 
focus of legal scholarship.1 This perspective has been reinforced 
by writing on the political economy of environmental regulation, 
which is typically framed by public choice theory’s narrative of 
agency capture by large regulated industries.2 
This Article will show that, as an empirical matter, the 
prevailing focus on corporate power is misplaced. Industrial 
sources as a class rarely account for more than fifteen percent of 
the emissions of most air pollutants;3 instead, diffuse sources in 
the transportation, residential, and small business sectors are 
 
1.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of 
Federalism in Mandating State Implementations of National Environmental 
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1222 (1992) 
[hereinafter Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom]; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996). 
2.  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (2001) [hereinafter 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation] (describing the dominant 
view of environmental federalism as being grounded on the belief that “public 
choice pathologies cause environmental interests to be systematically 
underrepresented . . . relative to business interests”); Stewart, supra note 1, at 
1215-16. 
3.  Other commentators have noted the importance of individual behavior as 
a major source of environmental harms; however, they have assumed incorrectly 
that this is a new phenomenon when, as shown below, it has been the norm 
from the start. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: 
The Individual as Regulatory Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 515, 517-18 (2004). 
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the dominant contributors nationally.4 Except for emissions from 
coal-fired power plants, air pollution is principally an urban 
problem for which the number of sources matters far more than 
their size.5 Urban areas are home to 80 percent of the United 
States population,6 and account disproportionately for the 50 
percent of Americans who in 2005 lived in areas that failed to 
meet one or more national standards. They are also closely 
associated with high levels of toxic air pollution—the ten largest 
cities encompass 88 percent of the population exposed to the 
highest excess cancer risks nationally.7 
The history of clean air policy reflects these patterns insofar 
as the strongest opposition to regulation has often involved the 
public rather than large industries. Experience implementing 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) in the 1970s illustrates the long-
standing importance of small sources and public attitudes. The 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), which 
established minimum health-based standards for six widely 
released “criteria” air pollutants, are viewed as the cornerstone 
of the statute.8 Yet, it was evident from the start that emissions 
 
4.  While the auto industry is clearly a “concentrated business interest,” 
transportation planning and reducing vehicle miles traveled have been the most 
persistent obstacle to reducing emissions from the transportation sector. The 
barriers to these policies fall outside the dominant public choice model. 
5.  By the mid-1960s, air pollution was widely understood to be primarily an 
urban problem closely associated with emissions from motor vehicles. JAMES E. 
KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON 
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 
1940-1975 202 (1977); Jeffrey Fromson, A History of Federal Air Pollution 
Control, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 516, 535 (1969) (observing that “[i]n 1967 it was 
estimated that over 90 percent of the [air pollution] in Los Angeles was caused 
by motor vehicle emissions”). 
6.  PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND 
CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod 
/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf. 
7.  The excess cancer risks in these cities were at least 100 times above the 
Clean Air Act’s target risk level of one excess death per million. See 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(f)(2) (2006). 
8.  Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1756 (1991) (describing the NAAQS as “the 
cornerstone of the CAA’s pollution control programs”); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 490-96, 514 (2011) (the 
“[t]he primary emphasis of the CAA is on the ‘attainment’ of these ambient 
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from older motor vehicles were the primary obstacle to states 
meeting the first NAAQS compliance deadline in 1975.9 By mid-
1973, the significance of this problem became clear when the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that at 
least ten major cities would have to ration gasoline.10 These 
findings were particularly ill timed, as they coincided with the 
public outcry over the gas shortages triggered by the 1973 OPEC 
oil embargo.11 
Public discontent boiled over later that year when, under 
court order, EPA issued a federal plan for California that 
required gas usage in Los Angeles to drop 82 percent during the 
smoggiest months.12 EPA’s plan was decried as absurd and met 
with utter disbelief by the public,13 prompting even the Sierra 
Club to acknowledge that it was unrealistic.14 To make matters 
worse, the court order binding EPA’s actions was not limited to 
California—it applied to another nineteen cities, including New 
York, Philadelphia, and Houston.15 Implementing such 
draconian measures ultimately proved to be a political non-
 
standards”); Jamie Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining 
Public Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 201 (2005) (describing the NAAQS program 
as “the heart of the Clean Air Act”). 
9.  John Bachmann, Will the Circle Be Unbroken: A History of the U.S. 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 57 J. AIR WASTE MGMT. ASSOC. 652, 
675 (2007) (stating that it “[i]t soon became clear that many states could not 
meet the 1975 attainment deadlines for all NAAQS”); John Quarles, The 
Transportation Control Plans—Federal Regulation’s Collision with Reality, 2 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 244 (1977) [hereinafter Quarles, Transportation 
Control Plans]. 
10.   JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 203 (1976) [hereinafter QUARLES, 
CLEANING UP AMERICA]; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 223. 
11.   QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 203; KRIER & URSIN, 
supra note 5, at 223. 
12.   Bachmann, supra note 9, at 675; Quarles, Transportation Control Plans, 
supra note 9, at 244-48; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 221-23. 
13.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 22-23, 239; QUARLES, CLEANING UP 
AMERICA, supra note 10, at 201-02. 
14.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 22-23, 239 (noting that part of the 
Sierra Club’s response to the debacle was to propose an emissions tax as an 
alternative measure). 
15.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 216; QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, 
supra note 10, at 201-02. 
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starter, and Congress backpedalled by passing the first of 
several delays in the NAAQS compliance deadlines.16 
One possible explanation for the focus on large industrial 
sources in the academic literature is the salience of anti-
corporate sentiment in environmental politics. The public 
backlash against clean air policies in the 1970s exposed both the 
practical constraints to progress (i.e., the inertia of replacing 
older vehicles) and the political pitfalls of regulatory policies that 
directly impact the public. In this light, framing environmental 
policy around industrial sources has obvious virtues—the 
populist appeal of targeting large companies, the moral clarity of 
a narrative in which industry unilaterally harms the public, and 
the benefit of tapping into the enduring belief that industry is 
the primary cause of environmental problems. Further, by 
absolving the public of responsibility, this view mitigates the 
risk of inciting a public backlash similar to that experienced in 
the 1970s. 
It is nevertheless surprising that academics have done little to 
challenge basic misperceptions about the relative importance of 
industrial sources, and that they frequently reinforce them.17 
Academic writing on environmental federalism, in particular, 
often assumes implicitly that industry is the primary obstacle to 
environmental regulation and that opposition from the public 
and small businesses is of marginal importance.18 This Article 
will examine the influence of this industry-centric perspective on 
environmental policy and theories of federalism. It will focus on 
 
16.   Quarles, Transportation Control Plans, supra note 9, at 249-51; Eli 
Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve 
the Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537, 551-53 (1974-75). 
17.   See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215-16; Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 555-56; Esty, supra note 1, at 587; 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and 
Is It “to-the-Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275–76 (1996-1997); Jonathan B. 
Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87  GEO, 
L.J. 749, 752-53 (1999); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in 
Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996). 
18.   See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215-16; Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 555-56; Esty, supra note 1, at 587; 
Engel, supra note 17, at 275-76; Wiener, supra note 17, at 752-53; Swire, supra 
note 17. 
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experiences under the CAA, which established the model for 
cooperative federal-state regulation found in the major national 
environmental laws. In doing so, the Article will draw on a 
variety of historical sources and geospatial databases compiled 
by EPA. 
The divergence between established views about cooperative 
federalism and its operation under the CAA illustrates the 
insights that emerge from an empirically grounded 
understanding of the law. A presumed virtue of cooperative 
federalism is that states make the difficult policy judgments 
regarding how to allocate emissions among sources. Cooperative 
federalism achieves this balance through a complementary 
division of authority between the federal government, which 
promulgates national standards, and the states, which 
determine how to meet them. Courts have interpreted this to 
mean that, while EPA retains oversight authority, states have 
complete discretion “to determine . . . the particular restrictions 
that will be imposed on particular emitters within their borders” 
so long as the national standards are met.19 
The EPA data show that the CAA’s system of cooperative 
federalism is undermined by legal and practical constraints on 
state programs. The overarching problem is a dearth of viable 
options available to states from which to select “particular 
restrictions” on air emissions.20 Their authority to regulate 
emissions from motor vehicles, the largest source of emissions, is 
restricted in most states to transportation planning, which has 
evoked strong public opposition and had few successes.21 
 
19.   EME Homer City Generation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7, 12, 29-
30 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
20.   Emissions from natural sources or long-distance transport of pollutants 
that remain in the atmosphere for weeks or months further limit state options. 
Jed Anderson, Revisiting the SIP Process: Finding a Better Approach to Cleaner 
Air, 36 ST. B. TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 214 (2005-2006) (noting that such 
background sources account for over 50 percent of the ozone pollution in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth area). 
21.   WINSTON HARRINGTON ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
EXHAUSTING OPTIONS: ASSESSING SIP-CONFORMITY INTERACTIONS 18, 33 
(2003) (finding that public opposition is “still strong” to the most promising 
methods (e.g., gasoline taxes, congestion fees) for reducing emissions from motor 
vehicles), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-exhaustopt.pdf; 
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Similarly, regulation of small stationary sources,22 which 
account for most of the remaining emissions, is impeded by 
political and administrative barriers that have stalled regulation 
for decades.23 The constraints on state programs are also 
greatest in large metropolitan areas where air quality is lowest. 
By contrast the barriers are lower for direct federal 
regulations, which according to recent empirical studies are the 
primary driver of reductions in air pollutants under the CAA. 
The success of federal regulations is attributable to two simple 
facts—federal regulations cover a large share of total air 
emissions, and they regulate sources that are relatively easy to 
control. In every state except California, EPA has had 
preemptive authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles 
since 1967, and beginning in 1990 it gained primary authority 
over regulation of emissions from electric utilities.24 To put this 
in perspective, these source categories account for roughly 40 to 
90 percent of each criteria pollutant’s emissions nationally.25 
 
Penny Mintz, Transportation Alternatives Within the Clean Air Act: A History 
of Congressional Failure to Effectuate and Recommendations for the Future, 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 156, 167, 191-92 (1994-95); Tirza S. Wahrman, Breaking the 
Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested Urban Roadways Under the Clean Air 
Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled, 8 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 181, 189-92 (1997-98); Craig Oren, Getting Commuters Out of 
Their Cars: What Went Wrong, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 143-47 (1998). 
22.   EPA refers to these sources as either “area” or “nonpoint” sources. 
Examples of nonpoint sources include gas stations, paint emissions, restaurants, 
and agricultural field burning. 
23.   See infra Part II.B. 
24.   New or modified industrial sources are subject to strict federal 
technology-based regulations. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), 
which are technology-based performance standards, operate as minimum 
standards that major sources of criteria pollutants are required to meet. At the 
same time, NSR offsets and emissions limits under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration program add further restrictions for nonattainment and 
attainment areas, respectively. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7470-79, 7503, 7511(C)(4) 
(2006). 
25.   See infra Part IIIA. Motor vehicles and electric utilities account for 82 
percent of nitrogen oxides emitted, 91 percent of sulfur dioxide, 76 percent of 
carbon monoxide, and 38 percent of volatile organic compounds (small 
stationary sources accounted for 54 percent of its emissions) in 2005. The sole 
exception to this dominance is small particulate matter (PM2.5), for which motor 
vehicles and electric utilities accounted for only about 20 percent of its 
emissions. 
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Despite these realities, academics, judges, and stakeholders 
routinely describe the CAA as a model of cooperative 
federalism.26 The schism between such broadly held beliefs and 
the realities on the ground illustrates the urgent need for more 
empirical studies of environmental laws in practice. Many 
academic debates focus on first principles, such as the relative 
merits of pure health-based standards versus balancing 
regulatory costs and benefits, without considering the effects of 
overlapping programs or systemic constraints. Political or 
ideological battles can reinforce these tendencies. Academics are 
notably silent, for example, about carve-outs in the NAAQS—
putatively national standards that afford multi-decade 
exemptions in areas with the worst air quality—and the 
daunting practical barriers to meeting them.27 
Recognizing the structural limits and inconsistencies of clean 
air policy opens up significant opportunities for reform, two of 
which will be outlined below as illustrative examples. First, the 
CAA’s system of cooperative federalism will continue to 
underperform unless it stimulates development of effective state 
and local policies for regulating smaller sources. EPA could be 
given the authority to set NAAQS compliance deadlines and to 
condition approval of state plans on adoption of specific 
programs. These reforms would refocus the planning process 
 
26.   See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and 
Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is 
Useful for Addressing Climate Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800, 817 (2008) 
(citing the CAA as a model for cooperative federalism); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009) 
(using the CAA as the exemplar of cooperative federalism in environmental 
law); Clean Air Act Forums: State, Local, and Federal Cooperation Under the 
Clean Air Act Before Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Barry R. 
Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, 
asserting that the CAA “has worked very well as a model of cooperative 
federalism”); GenOn REMA v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 
1213) (describing cooperative federalism as a “defining feature” of the CAA); 
Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the CAA 
as “a model of cooperative federalism”). 
27.   But c.f. David Harrison, Jr. & Paul R. Portney, Making Ready for the 
Clean Air Act, 5 REG. 24, 26 (1981) (observing that “the current ‘uniform’ 
standards are not really uniform at all . . . . [g]iven both de jure and de facto 
departures from uniformity”). 
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from meeting narrow bureaucratic ends to developing innovative 
programs and transparent compliance schedules. Second, federal 
regulation of major industrial sources skews regulatory priorities 
and unnecessarily limits state authority to select policies and 
allocate emissions across sources. I will argue that the two 
programs could be eliminated as part of compromise legislation 
to achieve broader reforms on issues such as climate change. 
This would represent a dramatic concession by environment-
alists, but could be implemented without negatively affecting 
human health. While I appreciate that this proposal cuts against 
deeply held views, significant legislative action is far less likely 
to occur if we fail to reconsider established beliefs or to exploit 
opportunities for compromise. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents an overview 
of clean air policy in the United States that challenges 
contemporary views about federalism and the role of business 
interests in environmental politics. Part II analyzes EPA data on 
air emissions and excess cancer risks to show empirically the 
importance of small sources and the origins of the systemic 
barriers to state clean air programs. Part III examines the 
implications of the findings in the preceding sections for 
environmental federalism, focusing on the limits of cooperative 
federalism and deviations from public choice theory. The number 
and diffuse nature of small sources are shown to qualify the 
conventional arguments for federal regulation, but the specific 
balance federal and state regulation will depend on the 
characteristics of the relevant sources. The findings are 
applicable to any area of environmental policy, including climate 
change mitigation,28 for which small sources are important. The 
final section, Part IV, examines two potential opportunities for 
reform that follow from the empirical results and an ecumenical 
view of environmental federalism. 
 
28.   JON CREYTS ET AL., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW 
MUCH AT WHAT COST? xii (2009) (stating that “abatement options [for reducing 
GHG emissions] are highly fragmented and spread across the [U.S.] economy”), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/sustainability/latest_thinking/ 
greenhouse_gas_abatement_cost_curves. 
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I. 
THE PRESSURES TO FEDERALIZE CLEAN AIR POLICY 
The history of clean air legislation provides a valuable 
perspective for critically analyzing contemporary policy debates. 
Three recurrent patterns standout in the narrative: (1) the 
emergence of innovative policies in localities with the worst air 
pollution; (2) the consistent dominance of emissions from small 
sources (i.e., motor vehicles, small businesses, residences); and 
(3) the prevalence of concerns that policies would disparately 
impact economic development in certain states or localities (e.g., 
urban versus rural areas). Experience implementing the CAA 
negates the conventional view that environmental politics is 
defined predominantly by conflicts with concentrated business 
interests. In practice, the political economy of clean air 
regulation is not nearly so one sided; to the contrary, opposition 
from the public and small businesses has frequently been a 
greater barrier to clean air policies than industry lobbying. 
At the outset, it is important to understand that severe air 
pollution almost invariably involves a confluence of adverse 
meteorological conditions and large numbers of sources 
concentrated in discrete areas.29 The worst air quality is found in 
urban areas and is closely tied to emissions from motor vehicles 
or the burning of coal.30 Historically, the most severe events have 
involved stagnant air conditions that trap pollutants at ground 
level,31 topography that impedes their lateral diffusion, or both.32 
From the 1940s to the 1960s, extreme pollution events in Donora 
(Pennsylvania), London, Los Angeles, and New York caused tens 
of thousands of deaths, and each event was precipitated by 
 
29.   J. CLARENCE DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 35-36 (1975) (noting 
that temperature inversions occurred on the east coast 10-30% of the time and 
on the west coast 35-40% of the time). 
30.   H.R. Anderson, Air Pollution and Mortality: A History, 43 ATMOSPHERIC 
ENV’T 142, 143 (2009). 
31.   COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 217 (August 1971); Anderson, supra note 30, at 143 
(observing that London, Meuse, Donora, Los Angeles all suffered from severe 
temperature inversions during the winters of their worst smog events). 
32.   Anderson, supra note 30, at 145. 
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adverse meteorological conditions.33 
Air pollution policy in the United States is separable into two 
distinct periods. The era of “smoke,” which spanned the mid-
1800s through the late 1940s and was associated with the use of 
coal for heating or power;34 and the era of “photochemical smog,” 
which began in the 1940s and continues through today and is 
largely associated with emissions from motor vehicles. We are 
arguably entering a third era that is likely to be dominated by 
regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions. During the smoke era, 
severe pollution, on a par with that in Beijing today, pervaded 
major U.S. cities such as Chicago, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.35 
Municipalities were the locus of regulation throughout this 
period,36 and cities like St. Louis, which had the first successful 
smoke abatement program, became models for the rest of the 
country.37 
Regulation during the smoke era relied heavily on switching 
to cleaner-burning fuels rather than emissions control 
technologies.38 By the mid-1940s, natural gas began to replace 
coal as the primary fuel for residential heating and commercial 
systems, and diesel became the predominant fuel for trains.39 
These transitions were essential to the dramatic gains in the 
1940s and 1950s, which cleared the air after decades of suffering 
 
33.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 104-06, 171, 264-65 (describing the 
pollution events in Los Angeles, London, and New York). 
34.   JOEL A. TARR, THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE SINK: URBAN POLLUTION 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 14 (1996) (describing smoke from coal burning as 
an urban residential problem compounded by industry and transportation). 
35.   Id. at 219 (“Severe smoke pollution persisted in American cities such as 
Chicago, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis for nearly a century, defying attempts at a 
solution.”). 
36.   DAVID STRADLING, SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENT-
ALISTS, ENGINEERS, AND AIR QUALITY IN AMERICA, 1881-1951 71, 75, 164-65, 
167-71 (1999) (noting that the St. Louis “Clean Fuels” ordinance of 1939 led to 
an 84% drop in hours of thick smoke); TARR, supra note 34, at 234-36, 249-50. 
37.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 71, 75; FRANK UEKOETTER, THE AGE OF 
SMOKE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-
1970 85, 118 (2009) (observing that St. Louis and Pittsburgh were the smoke-
abatement “models for the country”). 
38.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 167-71. 
39.   TARR, supra note 34, at 17-18. 
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in just a few years.40 The improvements in air quality also 
greatly enhanced the status of municipal agencies and prolonged 
their dominance in clean air policy through the early 1960s.41 
The smog era initiated a radical move from local policies to 
federal legislation. The populist politics of clean air policy 
nevertheless persisted despite the differences in sources and 
pollutants. The reform movements in both eras focused initially 
on large industries, owing to their visibility and association with 
pollution, whereas the importance of smaller sources was 
controversial and recognized only after regulation of industrial 
sources failed to reduce pollution levels.42 Public debate also 
followed a progression from activism based on moral principles 
to a focus on technology and economics,43 and this shift led to the 
establishment of independent institutes to assess emerging 
scientific results and prominent roles for technical experts.44 The 
diffuse origins of air pollution, and particularly their failure to fit 
a simple narrative of industry unilaterally harming the general 
public, facilitated this progression in both eras. 
The emergence of smog was a byproduct of the post-war 
economic boom and the rapid urbanization that followed. Motor 
vehicles replaced coal burning as the primary cause of poor air 
quality, and coal use migrated from trains and diffuse 
residential sources to huge electric utilities. The geographic scale 
and nature of air pollution changed as a consequence, placing 
 
40.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 167-71, 182, 189. 
41.   UEKOETTER, supra note 37, at 86, 152-153 (quoting the Council of State 
Governments as stating in 1967 that “Local government . . . are the leaders in 
air pollution control efforts”). In fact, states were often uninterested in urban 
problems with air pollution because of the political power of rural interest 
groups. Id. at 150. 
42.   Id. at 39 (describing the municipal reform efforts in the late 1800s that 
began with campaigns against industry); TARR, supra note 34, at 15, 231, 238 
(noting that “domestic smoke was dirtier and far more harmful than industrial 
smoke” and that early ordinances nevertheless focused on industrial and 
transportation sources). 
43.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 42, 59, 86-87, 101-02, 106-08, 136-38 
(describing the increased focus on economics as a rationale for guiding policy 
decisions). 
44.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 98-100. In St. Louis, for example, the 
Smoke Abatement League conducted its own investigations and made citizens 
arrests. Id. at 54-55. 
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new strains on local governments that were often poorly suited 
to manage them. Los Angeles, and later California as a whole, 
was at the forefront of this transformation and the early 
development of smog abatement policies. The discussion that 
follows begins with Los Angeles because its regulations were the 
starting point for modern clean air policy in the United States. 
A. California as a Policy Incubator 
Los Angeles was the fastest growing metropolitan area in the 
country following the Second World War, and this growth owed 
much to the popular images of its ideal climate and healthy 
environment.45 The occurrence of severe smog events in the 
1940s thus represented a dramatic change that threatened “the 
very foundations of the city’s existence.”46 Together, adverse 
local meteorology and rapid post-war development conspired to 
make Los Angeles an unique laboratory for developing the 
scientific understanding of urban air pollution and model policies 
for combatting it.47 
The local politics in Los Angeles followed the trajectory of 
policy debates during the smoke era. Public organizers and city 
officials focused initially on large industrial sources, and only 
after years of worsening conditions were they persuaded that 
motor vehicles were the primary source of photochemical smog.48 
Initial responses were limited to establishing a countywide air 
pollution control district and issuing technology-based standards 
 
45.   SCOTT H. DEWEY, DON’T BREATH THE AIR: AIR POLLUTION AND U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 1945-1970 37-38 (2000); UEKOETTER, supra note 37, 
at 198-99 (describing Los Angeles as a “healthful land and a tourist paradise”). 
46.   UEKOETTER, supra note 37, 198-99. Pollution events in the 1950s and 
60s led to continued public activism and support from the Chamber of 
Commerce for effective regulations. Dewey, supra note 45, at 94-97. 
47.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 37-38; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 42-45 
(description of the meteorological and topographic factors that greatly 
exacerbate air pollution in Los Angeles). 
48.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 40, 108-09 (observing that public criticism of 
emissions from industrial facilities persisted into the 1960s despite the contrary 
science); KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 58, 74 (noting that Los Angeles city 
officials often stated that motor vehicles were “relatively minor” sources of air 
pollution). 
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for prominent industrial sources.49 Predictably, these early 
efforts did little to prevent conditions from deteriorating. Los 
Angeles was already the driving capital of the world by the end 
of the 1940s50—the metropolitan area had 50 percent more 
vehicles than New York City and greater numbers than 
countries other than Britain, Canada, and France.51 
Two events redirected attention to motor vehicles. First, the 
coincidence in November 1949 of a severe inversion and a 
maximum-capacity football game in Berkeley provided a vivid 
example of the link between air pollution and motor vehicles.52 
Second, Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, a professor at the California 
Institute of Technology, published experimental results 
demonstrating the link between motor vehicle emissions and 
smog.53 Similar to today with climate change, scientific 
consensus on Dr. Haagen-Smit’s findings arose quickly, 
solidifying by 1955, while public acceptance ebbed and flowed 
over a much longer period.54 The work of the independent Air 
Pollution Foundation, which was established by a coalition of 
businessmen, civic leaders, and government officials, was 
ultimately critical to shifting public opinion.55 
Los Angeles made little progress during the 1950s despite the 
scientific advances owing to a combination of technological 
barriers and jurisdictional fragmentation.56 This failure and 
 
49.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 42; UEKOETTER, supra note 37, at 160 (noting 
that governments officials “had no choice but to take technological possibilities 
as their starting point” due to limited knowledge of the risks); KRIER & URSIN, 
supra note 5, at 60-61, 66 (Los Angeles imposed technology-based standards on 
new or modified sources “wherever there is a way to control it, it must be 
controlled to the limits of present-day engineering knowledge”). 
50.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 71-72. 
51.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 58. 
52.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 47-48; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 75-76]. 
53.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 47-48; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 75-76. 
54.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 49; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 6, 80 
(discussing early public skepticism that the science were merely a “conspiracy 
by the ‘interests’ to blame smog problems on innocent citizens”); UEKOETTER, 
supra note 37, at 206 (discussing the resistance of the auto industry into the 
1960s). 
55.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 84-85. 
56.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 98. During the mid-1950s, there were 
intense debates over threshold for proving harm that would justify regulation 
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rising public concern prompted state intervention in 1960. 
Passage of the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act 
established the first statewide Board with the authority to set 
emissions standards, in this case for new and used vehicles.57 
The Board issued its first standards in 1961 for new vehicles 
without significant public opposition.58 However, its carefully 
phased-in standards for used vehicles triggered an enormous 
public outcry that led to their withdrawal in 1965.59 This 
experience had major ramifications, as it effectively foreclosed 
subsequent consideration of regulations for used vehicles. The 
controversy was also a harbinger of the public backlashes 
against transportation regulations that erupted in the early 
1970s and 1990s.60 
Despite his free-market beliefs, Governor Ronald Reagan 
oversaw a dramatic expansion of state clean air regulations in 
1967. The law extended state regulation to stationary sources, 
divided the state into air basins, and centralized state-level 
regulatory authority in the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB).61 These measures co-evolved with the legal framework 
of the CAA, including its system of cooperative federalism. Using 
an analogous division of authority, CARB set state ambient air 
quality standards while local governments implemented them 
and had the freedom to set more stringent standards.62 Local 
governments also retained the authority to regulate stationary 
sources, whereas CARB could intervene only if local programs 
 
and over the use of cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 120-22. 
57.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 64. 
58.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 152-53. 
59.   Id.; DEWEY, supra note 45, at 102-03 (describing the mishandling that 
led to the overwhelming public opposition). 
60.   CHARLES O. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF 
POLLUTION CONTROL 66 (1975) (describing how the auto industry subjected 
California regulations to “the most unbelievable” opposition); UEKOETTER, supra 
note 37, at 210 (noting that the relationship between Los Angeles officials and 
car companies began well but collapsed into disillusionment by August 1956). 
61.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 73; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 178-79. 
62.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 178-79. This framework was dictated in 
part by constitutional limits on state regulatory authority vis-a-vis munici-
palities and counties. Id. 
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failed to meet state standards.63 
The policy developments in California did not occur in 
isolation. Many large urban areas were suffering from severe air 
pollution by the 1960s,64 and local governments elsewhere were 
beginning to take action.65 Local regulation in other states 
tended to be weak, though. Unlike California—where severe air 
pollution was a pervasive problem—local regulation was often 
constrained by state politics that were dominated by rural 
interests.66 Further, the viability of local regulation was in 
decline following the rapid suburbanization of the 1950s and 
1960s. The resulting expansion of urban boundaries greatly 
exacerbated mismatches between the geographic scale of air 
pollution and the jurisdiction of local agencies.67 
In retrospect the 1960s was a transitional period marked by 
emerging federal action and debate over the balance of authority 
between federal and state programs. Congress began by enacting 
a series of laws to support state clean air programs, but by 1965 
took the unprecedented step of regulating emissions from motor 
vehicles directly. Although California congressmen succeeded in 
preserving the state’s regulatory authority under the new law,68 
the trend by the late 1960s was clearly toward enhanced federal 
oversight and direct regulation. 
 
63.   Id. 
64.   Id. at 41; Davies, supra note 29, at 134-35; Uekoetter, supra note 37, at 
154. 
65.   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STATE AND 
LOCAL PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 112-13, 115-17, 120 (1966) 
(describing a series of leading state programs in the 1960s). 
66.   UEKOETTER, supra note 37, at 150 (observing “state legislatures showing 
little concern due to the predominance of rural interests”); JONES, supra note 
60, at 50 (describing how support for effective air regulations was stronger at 
the municipal level in Pennsylvania). 
67.   UEKOETTER, supra note 37, at 150-51, 178 (describing the “crisis of 
municipal air pollution control” that emerged in the 1950s after the successes of 
the anti-smoke initiatives). 
68.   JONES, supra note 60, at 83-84 (noting that California retained the 
authority to set standards more stringently than those of the federal 
government); DAVIES, supra note 29, at 57-58. 
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B. The Punctuated Evolution of Federal Clean Air Policy 
Political support for federal action on clean air policy was 
primarily sparked by concerns about emissions from motor 
vehicles, as opposed to fears about industrial sources. National 
awareness established a foothold following the release of a 1962 
Surgeon General’s report that confirmed the close association 
between poor air quality and motor-vehicle emissions.69 This 
foothold was solidified by 1969 when a Senate Commerce 
Committee report concluded, “[t]he automobile is the primary 
villain in air pollution.”70 The politically salient effects were 
associated with increasingly severe pollution events in urban 
areas,71 which showed that Los Angeles was not a unique case, 
but instead an extreme example of a systemic problem.72 
The legal framework for the CAA emerged incrementally over 
roughly a fifteen-year period during which clean air politics 
shifted from a focus on motor vehicles to one on large industrial 
sources. The first phase, dating back to the Clean Air Act of 
1963, established the federal government as a clearinghouse for 
scientific information.73 Consistent with the “states’ rights” 
beliefs that prevailed through the early 1960s, the federal 
government was limited to providing technical and financial 
support to the states. This step was significant because it began 
the process of carving out a role for the federal government by 
requiring it to issue the technical “criteria” that each state would 
 
69.   JONES, supra note 60, at 62-63; Dewey, supra note 45, at 75 (Congress 
acknowledged that autos were “responsible for 50% of the national air pollution 
problem”). Policymakers and experts also understood by this time that “the 
major sources [of smog] were everyday activities of the public, not industrial 
operations.” KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 91 
70.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 202; see also Fromson, supra note 5, at 
535 (observing that “[i]n 1967 it was estimated that over 90 percent of the [air 
pollution] in Los Angeles was caused by motor vehicle emissions”). 
71.   DAVIES, supra note 29, at 134-35. Air pollution in interstate urban 
centers, in particular, was proving to be intractable for state regulators and 
provided a compelling case for federal action. Id. at 134-35; see also UEKOETTER, 
supra note 37, at 154. 
72.   Edmund S. Muskie, The Clean Air Act: A Commitment to Public Health, 
ENVTL. F. 13, 13 (Jan.-Feb. 1990); KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 41. 
73.   DAVIES, supra note 29, at 165. 
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use to set ambient air quality standards.74 
Just two years later, the federal government advanced to 
regulating emissions from motor vehicles under the Motor 
Vehicle Pollution Control Act (MVPCA), mirroring earlier 
developments in California. Beyond the importance of their 
emissions, motor vehicles were an attractive regulatory target 
politically because their interstate movement and national 
market defused concerns about states’ rights. The law evoked 
strong criticism, though, for failing to be explicit about whether 
it preempted state regulation.75 Under intense pressure from 
escalating public concern about air pollution and auto industry 
objections to conflicting state standards,76 Congress passed the 
1967 Federal Air Quality Act. The new law resolved the 
preemptive effect of the MVPCA (with the California exemption 
intact) and added new layers of federal oversight, most 
importantly federal approval of state ambient air quality 
standards and state plans for implementing them, but was 
burdened by onerous procedural requirements.77 
The pivotal 1970 Clean Air Act added the final elements of the 
statute’s framework for cooperative federalism and established 
breathtakingly ambitious goals.78 The standards for new motor 
vehicles, which required roughly a 90 percent reduction in 
emissions by 1975, were the most hotly contested provisions.79 
Structurally, the new law created the NAAQS, with strict 
 
74.   JONES, supra note 60, at 74-76. Although toothless, the 1963 CAA 
included a provision for “federal abatement” of air pollution when human health 
or welfare were “endangered”; this authority was never exercised. Id. 
75.   BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 663. 
76.   Davies, supra note 29, at 53-54 (discussing the more than 100 clean air 
bills that were pending nationally in 1967); KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 
174. 
77.   DAVIES, supra note 29, at 57-58; JONES, supra note 60, at 83. 
78.   Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of 
Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 324-5 (1991) 
(describing the numerous deadlines under the 1970 CAA as being highly 
ambitious if not completely unrealistic). 
79.   The new standards required a 90 percent reduction in the emissions of 
key pollutants from motor vehicles by January 1975. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 
5, at 206, 208 (noting that regulatory standards were taken from a 1970 report 
prepared by the National Air Pollution Control Administration using very 
conservative assumptions). 
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compliance deadlines for listed “criteria pollutants,”80 and a 
cooperative division of authority between the federal government 
and the states.81 Adoption of national standards, however, was 
not a foregone conclusion. They had been debated extensively 
but rejected in 1967,82 while the leading proponent of clean air 
legislation, Senator Edmund Muskie, had opposed national 
standards based on fears that disparate local conditions would 
make them inefficient if not unworkable.83 Presidential politics 
would later encourage Senator Muskie to reverse his position 
during an ultimately unsuccessful run for the highest office.84 
National standards also created politically divisive issues of 
their own. The heterogeneity of air quality across the country—
most importantly between rural and urban areas—implied that 
jurisdictions with poor air quality would be required to subject 
sources to stringent emissions limits.85 State and local officials 
argued that national standards would put urban areas at a 
competitive disadvantage and opposed them.86 Congress 
addressed these concerns by adding another layer of regulation: 
“New Source Performance Standards” (NSPS), which set 
minimum technology-based standards for significant new 
 
80.   The six air pollutants regulated under the NAAQS program are referred 
to as “criteria pollutants.” BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 671. 
81.   42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006). 
82.   JONES, supra note 60, at 79-80; BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 664 (noting 
that the Johnson Administration believed national standards would “avoid 
placing industries at a competitive disadvantage”). 
83.   JONES, supra note 60, at 79-82; BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 664. Other 
commentators viewed “the process of defining air basins or AQCRs [as] a 
‘pointless charade’” due to the inadequacies of emissions inventories and the 
limitations in modeling capabilities; they endorsed technology-based approaches 
before modeling. BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 665-66. 
84.   JONES, supra note 60, at 179-81, 195; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 
201-03; STRADLING, supra note 36, at 30 (urban communities feared that 
regulations would “prevent industry from locating in their cities or force existing 
industries to [leave]”). 
85.   BACHMANN, supra note 9, at 664 (describing how one of the Johnson’s 
Administration’s “policy goals was to ensure that industry in cleaner areas did 
not have an advantage over those in dirtier areas”). 
86.   DAVIES, supra note 29, at 134; TARR, supra note 34, at 370 (noting that 
in 1935 the National Resource Committee found that lack of uniformity of 
regulations led to unfair competition between states for industry). 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 21 
industrial sources independently of local air quality.87 The floor 
they provided was designed to mitigate disparities in emissions 
limits between localities, and thus to level the regulatory playing 
field.88 
Congress’ decision to set aggressive compliance deadlines for 
the NAAQS became a defining feature of the 1970 Amendments. 
This mandate was integral to the “action forcing” philosophy of 
the time, and key congressional members understood the 
implications of the short deadlines and basing the NAAQS solely 
on protecting “human health and welfare.” The legislative report 
of the Senate Committee on Public Works estimated that “as 
much as seventy-five percent of the traffic may have to be 
restricted in certain large metropolitan areas if health standards 
are to be achieved within the time required by this bill.”89 
Restrictions of this magnitude were unavoidable because the 
CAA’s motor vehicle standards applied only to new vehicles, and 
thus would not significantly impact air pollution for more than a 
decade.90 
It did not take long for the statute’s bold objectives to run up 
against political realities and deteriorating global economics. 
The energy crisis of the 1970s sapped political support for 
aggressive environmental policies and spurred Congress to pass 
legislation in 1974 to slow the phase-in of controls on vehicle 
emissions.91 More ominously, at a time when Americans were 
reeling from gas shortages associated with the 1973 OPEC oil 
embargo, EPA’s analyses concluded that thirty-eight cities would 
require aggressive transportation control plans and that at least 
ten would have to institute gasoline rationing.92 
 
87.   42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
88.   W. Perry Pendley & J. Michael Morgan, The Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977: A Selective Legislative Analysis, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 747, 785 
(1978) (describing Congress’s intent that NSPS would “plac[e] all states on an 
equal footing in their efforts to attract industry and control development”). 
89.   S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 2 (1970) (emphasis added). 
90.   Id.; QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 193, 201. 
91.   QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA supra note 10, at 193, 207, 210; JOHN 
C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 102, 110 (1976) (noting that Congress also 
enacted measures to promote a shift to coal in the electric utility sector). 
92.   QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 203; KRIER & URSIN, 
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California became the epicenter of rising public opposition to 
national standards in large part because of the severity of its 
problems. The impossibility of meeting the NAAQS in Los 
Angeles led to several failed attempts to craft a workable state 
plan; unsurprisingly, all were doomed by the inadequacies of 
their transportation control measures.93 EPA rejected 
California’s state plan in 1972 and, under court order, issued a 
federal plan in 1973.94 The national standards left no other 
choice, and the implications for Los Angeles were stunning—
EPA’s plan required gas usage to drop by 82 percent from May 
through October, along with parking restrictions, tolls, and 
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs.95 
The public outcry was overwhelming. EPA’s plan was derided 
as “absurd” and met with “utter disbelief” by the public,96 
relatively modest programs, such as parking surcharges, were 
also fiercely opposed and ultimately withdrawn from subsequent 
state plans, which left the Los Angeles area without either a 
state or federal plan for more than two decades.97 These 
responses revealed a far less progressive side of the public’s 
interests and the populist limits of clean air policy. 
The relationship between federal and state officials also 
shifted following passage of the 1970 CAA.98 Ironically, the 
 
supra note 5, at 223. 
93.   Alan C. Waltner, Paradise Delayed – The Continuing Saga of the Los 
Angeles Clean Air Implementation Plan, 14 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 247, 248-
49 (1996). An important element of this was states’ failure to impose indirect 
source controls (e.g., highways, shopping malls) associated with urban growth. 
See Patrick Del Duca & Daniel Mansueto, Indirect Source Controls: An 
Intersection of Air Quality Management and Land Use Regulation, 24 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1131, 1149-54 (1991). 
94.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 221; QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, 
supra note 10, at 201-02. 
95.   JONES, supra note 60, at 270-71; QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, 
supra note 10, at 202. Moreover, the court order binding EPA’s actions was not 
limited to California—it applied to another nineteen cities, including New York, 
Philadelphia, Houston, and Dallas. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 216. 
96.   QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 201-02. 
97.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 228-29; QUARLES, CLEANING UP 
AMERICA, supra note 10, at 203; Del Duca & Mansueto, supra note 93, at 1140-
41. 
98.   JONES, supra note 60, at 68. 
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change was most pronounced in California despite its 
longstanding leadership on clean air policy and the widespread 
extent of air pollution in the state. By June 1971, Dr. Haagen-
Smit, who was the head of CARB and had pioneered the 
scientific work on smog, concluded that “some aspects of the 
federal regulations were unachievable.”99 His reservations were 
borne out by EPA estimates that it would take at least twenty 
years for Los Angeles to comply with the NAAQS.100 Further, it 
was a California lawsuit that would narrow EPA’s oversight 
authority and drastically limit the agency’s capacity to promote 
meaningful transportation control measures.101 
C. Political Compromise and Federal Expansion 
The enormous public opposition EPA encountered in the early 
1970s prompted a series of retrenchments, which began with 
extensions of compliance deadlines but later included more 
fundamental changes. The political compromise that emerged 
from these setbacks retained putatively national standards, but 
did so by, in effect, trading space for time through a system of 
delayed compliance dates for jurisdictions with the worst air 
quality.102 This strategy retained the moral appeal of the 
NAAQS, which remained nominally health-based, while avoiding 
the public backlash from imposing draconian restrictions on 
driving in major urban centers. 
The 1977 Amendments to the CAA represented the first 
concerted effort by Congress to address the shortcomings of the 
statute. The changes were prompted by technological problems 
 
99.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 210-12. 
100.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 213. 
101.   Id. at 169-75 (concluding that Brown v. EPA and other cases 
“eliminated EPA’s ability to apply sanctions to force states to . . . spend tax 
dollars regulating traffic . . . . leav[ing] a yawning breach in the [CAA]”). 
102.   In one of the most detailed accounts of EPA’s implementation of the 
CAA in the 1970s, Shep Melnick describes this as a “conscious political strategy 
[to] bend on deadlines, but never on goals; keep goals out of reach to put 
constant pressure on regulators and polluters. Relaxing goals would not only 
weaken the technology-forcing thrust of the Clean Air Act, but would signal a 
general retreat from environmental protection.” R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION 
AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 363 (1983). 
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with meeting the emissions standards for motor vehicles, the 
need to delay further the NAAQS compliance deadlines, and 
conflicts that had emerged over emissions from coal-fired power 
plants.103 Against the backdrop of the 1970s energy crisis, the 
pressure to delay the NAAQS compliance deadlines and motor 
vehicle standards was intense.104 As a result, the decision by 
Congress to push back the compliance dates involved a long and 
contentious bargaining process but was ultimately a foregone 
conclusion.105 
The most significant amendments in 1977 concerned parallel 
regulations of major industrial sources.106 The disputes centered 
on emissions from coal-fired power plants in rural areas, 
particularly around national parks, and efforts by congressional 
members to protect the interests of eastern coal companies.107 
The battle over rural air quality revived concerns about 
maintaining a level regulatory playing field across states.108 In 
 
103.   RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND THE COAL 
COALITION 208- 209, 214, 218 (1980). 
104.   QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 206-07; see also 
Bruce Karmer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Retreat from 
the Technology-Forcing Strategy?, 15 URB. L. ANNUAL 103, 121-22 (1978) 
(describing the extensions for NAAQS to 1982 and, in the case of CO and ozone, 
until as late as 1987). 
105.   Pete Domenici, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 19 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 475, 483 (1979). 
106.   There were significant amendments relating to mobile sources as well, 
most notably limits on EPA regulating “indirect” sources of air pollution (e.g., 
shopping malls or sports stadiums that would increase traffic) and provisions 
attempting to clarify that the CAA does not “infringe[] on . . . or transfer[] . . . 
the existing authority of countries and cities to plan or control land use.” Del 
Duca & Mansueto, supra note 93, at 1155. 
107.   VIETOR, supra note 103, at 209- 210; MELNICK, supra note 102, at 80 
(noting that “[t]he problem of greatest concern to environmentalists was the 
construction of coal-burning power plants in the Rocky Mountains . . . . With 
electricity often cheaper to transport than coal, utilities intended to build large 
mine-mouth plants adjacent to sources of low-sulfur coal and send electricity to 
metropolitan areas in southern California). 
108.   Domenici, supra note 105, at 481-82 (describing concerns about limits 
on economic growth as having the potential to “trigger a backlash that could 
jeopardize the entire Act”); VIETOR, supra note 103, at 164, 212 (quoting a 
Supreme Court brief for urban mayors and eastern industrial states: “The 
requirement of no-significant deterioration prevents rural regions from allowing 
lenient emission controls that are so much less expensive that an industry will 
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this case, the concern was precipitated by a 1972 court opinion 
holding that new industrial sources in “attainment areas” 
meeting the NAAQS could not cause a “significant deterioration” 
of local air quality, even if their emissions would not result in a 
NAAQS violation.109 This holding imposed, in effect, more 
stringent ambient air pollution standards in rural areas relative 
to their urban counterparts. 
EPA responded to the opinion by establishing the “Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) program, which was built 
around a three-level system of incremental standards for new 
facilities.110 The program was strongly opposed by officials in 
rural western states, who viewed it as impeding economic 
development.111 Congress responded by codifying the PSD 
program along with a second program directed largely at urban 
areas, New Source Review (NSR), which imposed heightened 
standards on new (or modified) sources in “nonattainment areas” 
out of compliance with one or more NAAQS.112 The NSR 
program was itself designed to ameliorate the growth-inhibiting 
effects of a provision in the 1970 CAA that required all state 
plans to contain regulations for rejecting new or modified sources 





have a financial incentive to relocate . . . no-significant deterioration removes 
the possibility of economic coercion between competing regions . . . .”); LESTER B. 
LAVE AND GILBERT S. OMENN, CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT 41 (1981) (describing congressional concerns that “environmental 
legislation was used to retard the migration of industry from the east”). 
109.   Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 1972); 
VIETOR, supra note 103, at 203. 
110.   MELNICK, supra note 102, at 88-89, 93-96. 
111.   VIETOR, supra note 103, at 203; A. STANLEY MEIBURG, PROTECT AND 
ENHANCE: JURIDICAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT 
DETERIORATION OF AIR QUALITY 162-63 (1991). 
112.   VIETOR, supra note 103, at 220-21 (characterizing the NSR program as 
having the same impact on nonattainment areas as PSD has on attainments 
areas, namely, “threaten[ing] to limit industrial growth and economic 
prosperity”); Karmer, supra note 104, at 126. 
113.   41 Fed. Reg. 55524, 55525 (Dec. 21, 1976); VIETOR, supra note 103, at 
220-21. 
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Coal interests were negatively impacted by both programs and 
thus received no countervailing benefits.114 They nevertheless 
managed to extract one important concession to compensate for 
these losses. With the support of environmentalists, they 
obtained a major victory for eastern coal companies under the 
NSPS program through a provision that required all coal-fired 
power plants to reduce SO2 emissions using a specific type of 
control technology.115 This narrowly prescriptive form of 
technology-based regulation neutralized the favorable economics 
of using lower-sulfur western coal to meet the NAAQS for SO2 
and, in doing so, preserved the market for high-sulfur eastern 
coal; it was also essential to limiting the economic benefits of 
siting new coal-fired power plants in relatively pristine areas of 
the west.116 
It is striking that none of the parallel programs in the CAA 
arose out of concerns about distinctive risks from major 
industrial sources—apart from electric utilities. In each case, the 
overriding concerns were that clean air regulations would 
impede economic development. The NSPS program was justified 
as offsetting the disparate impacts of the NAAQS; the NSR 
program was rationalized as limiting emissions on individual 
sources to allow for greater aggregate economic development in 
nonattainment areas; and the PSD program, which was 
motivated by concerns about emissions from electric utilities, 
was “designed to allow room for additional industrial growth . . . 
[in] the West [while avoiding] the mistakes of the industrialized 
East.”117 Despite the prevailing economic concerns, this pattern 
contrasts the evolution of regulations for diffuse, small sources, 
which continued to lag in comparison to those for major 
 
114.   VIETOR, supra note 103, at 206-07 (describing industry claims that the 
PSD program would foreclose construction of 79 percent of the power plants 
then being planned); QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA, supra note 10, at 193, 
210. 
115.   LAVE & OMENN, supra note 108, at 41. 
116.   Pendley & Morgan, supra note 88, at 786, 792-93 (describing 
congressional concern that the NSPS would otherwise “give a competitive 
advantage to those States with cheaper low-sulfur coal and create a 
disadvantage for Mid-western and Eastern states where predominantly higher 
sulfur coals are available”). 
117.   Domenici, supra note 105, at 480-81. 
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industrial sources, thereby inverting the dynamics predicted by 
public choice theory. 
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA emerged out of the 
continuing problems with meeting the NAAQS and rising 
concerns about SO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants. The 
amendments to the NAAQS program instituted an elaborate, 
multi-tiered system of compliance deadlines, which allowed for 
extensions through 2010.118 The program for power plants was 
the first to adopt a market-based system for controlling 
emissions,119 and similar to the PSD program it was designed to 
address specific impacts (such as interstate fallout from acid 
rain) of emissions from power plants.120 Although the program 
was initially controversial, it ultimately proved to be both 
effective and efficient, and it is now widely viewed as being 
highly successful.121 
Other significant amendments strengthened regulations for 
fuels used in motor vehicles and attempted to promote adoption 
of transportation control measures.122 The regulations governing 
fuels have been particularly successful, in part because they 
have impacted emissions from all vehicles as opposed to only 
new ones. The transportation planning provisions, by contrast, 
were often ineffective, if not moribund, due to a combination of 
 
118.   Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 181(a), 186(a), 188(c); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7511(a), 7513(a) 7513(c) (the deadlines for attainment were from four to 
twenty years from 1990; the longest extension, to November 2010, was for areas 
rated as “extreme” for ozone levels); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Missing 
Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air Act’s VOC Emissions Reduction 
Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 51-55 (1999) 
(describing the modifications to the SIP process, which included a specific 1996 
milestone for reducing ambient levels of criteria pollutants in non-attainment 
areas). 
119.   The power plant regulations were designed to address the interstate 
problem of acid rain, which was caused primarily by SO2 emissions from coal-
fired power plants and had emerged as a major political issue nationally. 
RICHARD E. COHEN, WASHINGTON AT WORK: BACK ROOMS AND CLEAN AIR 56-
57, 127-28 (1992). 
120.   Id.; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 403, 407; 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7651(b), 7651(f). 
121.   Bachman, supra note 9, at 292. 
122.   Id. at 56-57, 60-61, 137-38. It is interesting to note that environment-
alists did not embrace alternative fuels at the time. Id. at 139. 
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political opposition and systemic barriers.123 Overall, the 1990 
Amendments continued the expansion of direct federal 
regulation with the new market-based regulations for electric 
utilities, but did little to alter the central framework of the CAA. 
Several broad patterns emerge from the last century of air 
pollution policy. First, national clean air standards were neither 
preordained nor uncontroversial. The successes of municipal 
smoke-abatement programs through the 1950s provide valuable 
contrary evidence, as do the pioneering programs in California to 
combat smog, which anticipated or evolved alongside federal 
policies. Second, costly or burdensome regulation of the general 
public and small businesses has precipitated powerful 
backlashes against environmental policies. Such experiences 
propelled the compromise that preserved the pure health-based 
criteria of the NAAQS by delaying their enforcement (often for 
decades) in areas with the worst air quality.124 Third, emissions 
of criteria pollutants from industrial sources have played a 
relatively minor, and often indirect, role in the evolution of clean 
air policy. The principal exception is controversies over coal-fired 
power plants, which shaped the PSD and NSPS programs; 
otherwise, state and local government concerns about economic 
development and maintaining a level regulatory playing field 
have dominated public debates.125 
The historical record highlights both the long-standing 
prominence of small sources and the persistent challenges 
(political and otherwise) of regulating them. The evolution of 
clean air policy is also notable for its inconsistencies with public 
choice theory—large, concentrated industries have been often 
subjected to more stringent regulation than either the general 
 
123.   Mintz, supra note 21, at 191-92; Wahrman, supra note 21, at 189-92; 
MELNICK, supra note 102, at 300, 308-09. 
124.   The focus of this Article is on the primary, health-based NAAQS, as 
opposed to the secondary, welfare-based NAAQS, which in any event are set at 
the same levels for most of the criteria pollutants. See Craig N. Oren, Is the 
Clean Air Act at A Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1242 (2011) (noting that 
“EPA has set secondary air quality standards for almost all pollutants as the 
same level as the primary, health-based standards”). 
125.   MELNICK, supra note 102, at 82, 98-99 (highlighting the importance of 
large cities and states recognizing that the PSD program could “protect against 
massive industrial migration to clean air regions”). 
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public or small businesses, despite their far greater numbers, 
more diffuse interests, and collectively larger impacts. Multiple 
reasons likely account for this divergence, including the visibility 
and salience of industrial emissions, but two are of particular 
importance here. First, once national ambient standards were 
put in place, technology-based regulations became an attractive 
means to level the regulatory playing field. For disadvantaged 
jurisdictions (i.e., highly populated urban areas), supplemental 
federal regulations protected local economic development, 
effectively inverting the favored industry argument against 
regulation. 
Second, the interests of small businesses and the public may 
be diffuse, but in absolute terms they are not necessarily small—
the pubic cares a great deal, for example, about having the 
freedom to use their cars and a variety of factors may make 
small businesses particularly resistant to regulation (e.g., 
limited expertise, capital, economies of scale). Under these 
circumstances, the motivation to speak out can transcend free-
rider and collective-action problems.126 Moreover, rather than 
being the impediment portrayed under public choice theory, 
large numbers can be a great asset, as widespread activism 
translates into political power. 
These observations help explain why regulation of large 
industries has been relatively progressive, as well as why 
regulations that impact the public and small businesses have 
proved so challenging. More fundamentally, they reveal that the 
common assumptions that underlie theorizing on environmental 
federalism are much more tenuous than conventional wisdom 
would suggest. The next section builds on this historical 
overview by analyzing the principal sources of air emissions 
essential to understanding how the CAA operates in practice. 
 
 
126.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 269-71 (describing the positive 
feedback between population levels and willingness to take action). 
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II. 
AIR POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AS A NUMBERS GAME 
I expect that many people, if asked, would identify industrial 
facilities as among the most important sources, if not the single 
largest source, of air pollution in the country. Debates over clean 
air policy reinforce this view, both with respect to their focus on 
regulating major industrial sources (particularly the New Source 
Review program) and their neglect of the implications of the 
close association between poor air quality and urbanization. The 
literature on the CAA also tends to focus either on high-level 
theories, such as debates over the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
setting NAAQS, the merits of uniform technology-based 
standards, and the virtues of market-based regulations,127 or 
discrete categories of sources.128 These divergent perspectives, 
either abstract or narrowly focused, tend to omit much of the 
context in which clean air policies are implemented. In many 
cases, the principal sources of air pollution, motor vehicles and 
small stationary sources, are overlooked altogether. 
The empirical analysis that follows fills in this broader context 
by evaluating the sources and pollutants that have the greatest 
impacts on air quality. The EPA data reveal cross-cutting 
patterns in which air emissions are dominated by numerous 
small sources, which emit among a dozen or so pollutants that 
account for a disproportionate share of aggregate emissions and 
 
127.   See, e.g., Gary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The 
Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1340-46 
(2004) (arguing that costs should be considered when setting NAAQS); Richard 
J. Pierce, The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental Regulation, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1272 (2002) (arguing that ways exist for EPA to work 
around the CAA’s rule against considering costs when setting NAAQS); Howard 
Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271 
(1985) (arguing in favor of uniform standards under statutes such as the 
NAAQS under CAA on the grounds of efficiency in practice); William F. 
Pederson, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1060-61 
(1981) (arguing that the CAA’s strict deadlines and elaborate procedures impede 
that refinement of policies as new scientific knowledge becomes available). 
128.   See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL 
DIRTY AIR 10-12 (1981) (discussing the inefficiency of narrow technology-based 
standards under the CAA’s New Source Performance Standards). 
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risks. Motor vehicles continue to be the single most important 
source of air pollution, and one major source, coal-fired power 
plants, stands out among industrial sources. The common 
denominator for most of the prominent sources is combustion of 



















Linking back to the preceding section, the historical data on 
criteria pollutants highlight the continuities in the sources and 
types of emissions over time. Figure 1 displays the major classes 
of five criteria pollutants in 1971.129 The data single out 
emissions from fuel combustion at stationary sources (i.e., 
electric utilities, heating), industrial processes, and motor 
vehicles. Industrial sources were the primary source of sulfur 
oxides (SOx) and particulate matter (PM) emissions,130 while 
 
129.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 18. Figure 1 omits two criteria 
pollutants—lead and carbon monoxide (CO). In both cases, motor vehicles 
accounted for most of their emissions (about 80 percent in the case of CO). Id. 
CO was emitted in much larger quantities than the other criteria pollutants, 
and lead was not listed until the mid-1970s. 
130.   It is important to note that emissions of PM were not broken down by 
size at this time. This is significant because smaller particles, now known as 
“PM2.5,” pose much greater health risks than the larger ones, and we now know 
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motor vehicles were the largest source of the chemical precursors 
for smog, nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), as well as carbon monoxide (CO). However in urban 
areas, motor vehicles accounted for much higher proportions of 
criteria pollutants—in Los Angeles, 50 percent of PM emissions, 
75 percent of NOx emissions, 90 percent of VOC emissions, and 
essentially 100 percent of CO emissions.131 These estimates are 
roughly consistent with the relative proportions of source-
category emissions observed today. 
EPA has also compiled data on emissions trends for criteria 
pollutants dating back to 1940, which is displayed in Figure 2 for 
three criteria pollutants.132 The SO2 data show the shift away 
from coal use for residential heating and transportation 
following the Second World War, as well as its revival in the late 
1950s when large, centralized electric utilities were becoming 
the norm. The impacts of the clean air legislation in the 1960s 
and 1970s are also clearly visible, with peaks in emissions 
occurring from the mid-1970s to early 1980s. Moreover, the 
trends for all three criteria pollutants should be calibrated 
against the 65-percent rise in the U.S. gross domestic product 
during this period.133 While the aggregate trends are moderately 
downward or flat, the emissions rates of individual sources 
declined dramatically over the period 1970 to 1998. 
 
that industrial sources tend to emit PM with large average particle sizes. 
131.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 19. Nationally, motor vehicles 
accounted for about four percent of PM emissions, fifty-one percent of NOx 
emissions, and fifty-five percent of hydrocarbon emissions in 1971. Id. at 18. 
132.   Figures 2 and 3 display EPA National Emissions Inventory data. See 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSIONS INVENTORY (NEI) AIR 
POLLUTANT EMISSIONS TRENDS DATA: 1900-1998 (2008), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends. 
133.   U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY , OUR NATION’S AIR: STATUS AND TRENDS 
THROUGH 2010 5 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/2011/report/ 
fullreport.pdf (highlighting that gross domestic product increased sixty-five 
percent and vehicles miles traveled forty percent between 1990 and 2010). 



























The rapid rises in emissions displayed in Figure 2 is the 
backdrop to the increasing frequency and intensity of severe 
pollution events that were occurring in the mid to late 1960s.134 
The growth in emissions was particularly high in the mid-1960s 
when Congress first enacted clean air legislation to regulate 
emissions from motor vehicles. The data merely allude to the 
sense of alarm and rising levels of public activism towards end of 
the 1960s. At the time, intensifying air pollution was viewed as a 
major threat to society, with some pundits asserting that cities 
like New York would become “uninhabitable within a decade” if 
current growth rates persisted.135 Even such a stalwart public 
official as the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare raised 
a warning in 1966 that “Americans might have to live in domed 
cities or go around in gas masks.”136 
One of the other notable patterns in these, and subsequent, 
data is the predominance of a few key pollutants. This 
phenomenon is reflected in the small number, six in all, of 
 
134.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 104-06, 264-65 
135.   DEWEY, supra note 45, at 133 (quoting Norman Cousins, editor of the 
Saturday Review). 
136.   Id. 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 34 
criteria pollutants.137 The same pattern is also observed, 
however, for air toxics despite the large number of compounds 
(about 190 in total) designated as “hazardous air pollutants.”138 
The twenty air toxics emitted at the highest levels in 2005 
accounted for more than 90 percent of aggregate emissions 
nationally,139 and among them just a handful accounted for a 
majority of the excess cancer risks.140 Thus, although the levels 
at which air pollutants are emitted vary enormously across the 
country, the principal pollutants are remarkably consistent. The 
analysis that follows will focus on the key criteria pollutants 
(VOCs, NOx, SO2, and PM2.5) and a small subset of air toxics, 
referred to here as the “NATA Toxics,” which are responsible for 
most of the excess cancer risks nationally.141 
The discussion in the sections below will examine the 
temporal trends and spatial patterns of air pollution in the 
United States. In addition to the data on criteria pollutants, the 
analysis will evaluate emissions data and cancer risk estimates 
for air toxics. Two primary motivations exist for analyzing them 
together: (1) they are often emitted by the same sources and thus 
are impacted by regulations under their respective programs; 
 
137.   Bachmann, supra note 9, at 674, 690 (describing how EPA recognized 
early on that “the NAAQS should be considered as a last resort” and decided in 
1971 to abandon plans to set NAAQS for 24 additional compounds). 
138.   See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI) 
BASIS OF OSHA CARCINOGENS (2011), available at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-
release-inventory-tri-program (showing that OSHA Carcinogens are Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) Section 313 listed toxic 
chemicals that meet OSHA carcinogen standard). 
139.   Ammonia, hydrochloric acid, and hydrofluoric acid are also each 
emitted in very large quantities; all are associated with respiratory toxicity. 
Confined animal feeding operations emit the overwhelming majority of 
ammonia; coal-fired power plants emit most of the hydrochloric and hydrofluoric 
acid. 
140.   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THE 2005 
NATIONAL-SCALE ASSESSMENT 3–4 (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/ 
nata2005/05pdf/sum_results.pdf [hereinafter NATA SUMMARY]. 
141.   The NATA Toxics, which EPA has identified as national or regional risk 
drivers in the 2005 NATA, include the following chemicals: 1,3 Butadiene, 1,4 
Dichlorobenzene, Acetaldehyde, Acrylonitrile, Benzene, Chromium Compounds, 
Formaldehyde, Naphthalene, Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons, and 
Tetrachloroethylene. Id. (identifying these chemicals as national and regional 
“cancer risk drivers”). 
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and (2) the cancer risk data available for air toxics are valuable 
insofar as they provide a complementary and more fine-grained 
picture of air pollution nationally. Before proceeding with the 
discussion, the next section will describe the EPA data and their 
limitations. 
A. Understanding EPA Emissions Inventories and Excess 
Cancer Risk Estimates 
EPA has defined four categories of sources (point, nonpoint, 
onroad mobile, nonroad mobile), which I will use throughout the 
Article with one important qualification.142 The terms “industrial 
source” and “point source” will be used interchangeably even 
though the point-source category includes smaller 
manufacturers and can encompass conventional nonpoint 
sources such as gas stations and dry cleaners.143 Treating data 
on point sources as though they are limited to industrial sources 
will cause the estimates of emissions and risks from industrial 
sources to be conservative by virtue of being over inclusive. A 
benefit of this approach is that it operates as a rough offset for 
potential errors in the EPA data.144 
 
142.   Point sources include large industrial facilities but also may include 
smaller commercial facilities, such as dry cleaners and gas stations. Nonpoint 
sources (previously “area sources”) include all stationary sources not treated as 
“point sources” because their locations cannot be accurately measured at the 
facility level (e.g., small manufacturers, fireplaces/wood stoves, construction, gas 
stations, waste disposal). Mobile sources include onroad vehicles (for example, 
cars, trucks, and buses) and nonroad sources (for example, trains, ships, 
construction equipment, and farm machinery). Background emissions include 
natural sources, persistent air toxics (for example, those originating from a 
previous year’s emissions), and long-range emissions (for example, those greater 
than fifty kilometers). ICF INT’L, AN OVERVIEW OF METHODS FOR EPA’S 
NATIONAL-SCALE AIR TOXICS ASSESSMENT 19 (2011) [hereinafter NATA OVER-
VIEW], available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/nata_tmd.pdf. 
143.   Id. 
144.   For example, the absence of reporting requirements for short-term 
releases associated with facility start-up, shut-down, and unanticipated 
disruptions, some of which can double the annual emissions of a facility, is a 
significant gap in the EPA data. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 7; 
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW OFF-THE-
BOOKS INDUSTRIAL UPSET EMISSIONS CHEAT THE PUBLIC OUT OF CLEAN AIR 1–
3 (2004), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pdf/publications/ 
eip_upsets_report_appendixa.pdf. 
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The analysis that follows will draw on three EPA databases 
(see Table 1); one that covers criteria pollutants and air toxics, 
and two that are specific to air toxics. EPA collects two types of 
data on air toxics—pollutant emissions levels and cumulative 
cancer risk estimates. The two types of data provide 
complementary views of air pollution across the country, as each 
metric has its limitations. Broad trends in emissions of air 
toxics, for example, reveal the relative importance of different 
source categories, whereas risk estimates provide a direct 
measure of harm but are subject to large uncertainties. The risk 
data for criteria pollutants are, somewhat surprisingly, much 
more limited; EPA releases only categorical data on whether a 
jurisdiction is or is not in attainment for a NAAQS—direct risk 
estimates are not available. 
TABLE 1:                                                                                                    EPA EMISSIONS AND 
EXCESS CANCER RISK DATABASES FOR AIR TOXICS 
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The emissions inventory data will be drawn from the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) and the tri-annual National Emissions 
Inventory (NEI). The TRI data are based on annually reported 
emissions of air toxics from major industrial sources,145 whereas 
 
145.   TRI Reporting Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/basics-tri-reporting 
(last visited April 21, 2014) (the TRI covers certain listed industries and any 
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the NEI data encompass emissions from all outdoor sources of 
air toxics and criteria pollutants (i.e., large and small stationary 
sources, onroad and nonroad mobile sources).146 With the 
exception of VOCs, the data on criteria pollutants are quite 
reliable because they are relatively easy to measure and have 
been subject to extensive monitoring.147 By contrast, only a 
subset of the data in the TRI and NEI are derived from direct 
measurements of VOC or air toxics emissions; most of the data 
are based on estimates derived from algorithms because direct 
measurement is difficult.148 
EPA has a program dedicated to promulgating the “emissions 
factors” incorporated into the algorithms used to estimate 
emissions from individual sources (e.g., chemical storage tanks 
at refineries, kilns at cement plants).149 Notwithstanding EPA’s 
best efforts, the emissions factors are subject to significant 
uncertainties.150 EPA’s primary check has involved 
benchmarking its emissions inventories against direct 
measurements of air toxics.151 These studies have found model 
estimates for several of the most important air toxics (i.e., 
acetaldehyde, benzene, butadiene, formaldehyde, naphthalene) 
 
company with greater than ten employees that manufactures or processes 
greater than 25,000 lbs. of TRI-listed chemicals annually or otherwise uses more 
than 10,000 lbs. of a listed chemical in a given year). 
146.   2005 National Emissions Inventory Data & Documentation, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2005inventory.html 
(last visited April 21, 2014) (descriptions of data and detailed documentation on 
the 2005 NEI). 
147.   Id. 
148.   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA 
CAN IMPROVE EMISSIONS FACTORS DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 4 (March 
2006), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060322-2006-P-00017.pdf (noting 
that emissions factors and simple algorithms are used for about eighty percent 
of emissions determinations). 
149.   David E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: 
Implications for Greenhouse Gas Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L.J. 273, 
294-97 (2013). 
150.   Id. 
151.   Nationally, air toxics are monitored at more than one thousand 
locations, although monitors are disproportionately located in urban areas. U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESULTS OF THE 2005 NATA MODEL-TO-MONITOR 
COMPARISON 1-1, 2-4 (Dec. 2010), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/ 
nata2005_model2monitor.pdf. 
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to be within a factor of two of the ambient levels measured.152 
Thus although significant errors and uncertainties persist, they 
are approaching a level of reliability that experts would like to 
attain consistently.153 
The second type of data cover excess cancer risk estimates 
that EPA generates tri-annually under its National-Scale Air 
Toxics Assessment (NATA).154 The cancer risk estimates use the 
NEI emissions data as an input for the EPA exposure models 
(i.e., fate and transport of air toxics).155 The NATA results are 
thus dependent on the accuracy of the NEI data, the EPA 
exposure models, and toxicity estimates for each compound. The 
complexity of the analyses that underlie the NATA cancer risk 
estimates introduces numerous opportunities for uncertainty 
and bias in the results.156 Thus, while the NATA data provide a 
direct measure of risk, they must be interpreted cautiously.157 
The uncertainties and potential biases in the NATA data vary 
along two dimensions—geographic scale and source category. For 
comparisons between jurisdictions, it is critical to keep in mind 
that the quality and detail of information differ between 
localities and that uncertainties in the data tend to be greater at 
smaller geographic scales.158 EPA cautions against using NATA 
 
152.   Id. at 4-1. 
153.   Id. at 3-20. 
154.   The cancer risks are expressed as “typical lifetime excess cancer risk” 
of, for example, ten per million. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 70. 
155.   Id. at 71-77 (describing the sources of uncertainty in deriving 
cumulative risk estimates for air toxics). The NATA database contains 
estimates of neurotoxicity and respiratory harms, but to avoiding making the 
analysis too unwieldy, this Article focuses on the cancer risk data alone. 
156.   To give just one significant example, NATA “might not accurately 
capture sources that have episodic emissions (e.g., facilities with short-term 
deviations in emissions resulting from startups, shutdowns, malfunctions, and 
upsets). The models assume emissions rates are uniform throughout the year.”  
Id. at 7. 
157.   EPA claims that NATA is a useful indicator of potential health risks 
from air toxics at “a given point in time,” but different NATAs cannot be 
compared because the pollutants differ between them. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE THE MANAGE-
MENT OF ITS AIR TOXICS PROGRAM 29 (June 2006), http://www.gao.goc/assets/ 
260/250607.pdf. 
158.   Adelman, supra note 149, at 294-97. 
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results “as a definitive means to pinpoint risk values within a 
census tract, to characterize or compare risks at local levels such 
as between neighborhoods, [or] to characterize or compare risks 
between states . . . .”159 Similarly, because of the spatial 
averaging over a census tract (or county) “individual exposures 
or risks might differ by as much as a factor of 10 in either 
direction [i.e., above or below a calculated mean].”160 For cross-
source comparisons, the quality of data for specific source 
categories (e.g., point versus nonpoint sources) and for individual 
sources will vary. 
EPA maintains that the estimates of relative contributions 
across source categories are among the most robust,161 but the 
uncertainties will be substantial for even the best (typically more 
aggregated) data. The various sources of error are factored into a 
rough bounding analysis described in a prior article,162 which 
shows that apart from a small number of jurisdictions the 
potential errors would not alter the conclusions of the analysis 
that follows. 
B. Cars and Coal: The Emissions of the Many versus the Big 
There are two striking patterns in the source-category data. 
First, motor vehicles and nonpoint source consistently account 
for a disproportionate share of the air pollutants emitted. A 
simple accounting of the criteria pollutants and NATA Toxics 
emitted by each source category clearly shows that such diffuse 
sources are responsible for most of the emissions. Figure 3 below 
displays the 2005 data for criteria pollutants.163 Industrial 
sources were the primary source of SO2, but one must keep in 
mind that a single type of facility, coal-fired power plants, was 
(and is) responsible for about 80 percent of SO2 emissions 
nationally. For all of the other criteria pollutants, motor vehicles 
 
159.   NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 5. 
160.   Id. at 69. 
161.   Id. at 5. 
162.   Adelman, supra note 149, at 333-34. 
163.   Carbon monoxide and lead are omitted in Figure 5. Nonpoint, onroad, 
and nonroad sources accounted for about ninety-five percent carbon monoxide 
emissions in 2005. 
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The national source-category emissions for air toxics roughly 
mirror those of the criteria pollutants. Industrial sources 
accounted for about 13 percent of the air toxics emitted 
nationally in 2005, whereas motor vehicles and nonpoint sources 
(e.g., gas stations, dry cleaners, surface-coating businesses, 
landfills) accounted for 48 and 39 percent, respectively.164 These 
averages are fairly representative of variation in the underlying 
data—industrial facilities rarely accounted for more than a 
quarter of aggregate toxic emissions from outdoor sources at 
either the county- or census-tract level. Moreover, the 
distribution of emissions across source categories has been 
relatively stable since at least the mid-1990s.165 
The observations for the NATA Toxics collectively are 
reinforced by the data on individual NATA Toxics (Figure 4 
below). Setting aside chromium (not shown below), all of the 
leading air toxics are weakly associated with industrial 
 
164.   Adelman, supra note 149, at 293. 
165.   Id. at 292. 
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emissions.166 The disaggregated data also highlight the degree to 
which emissions are skewed towards a small number of 
pollutants—benzene and formaldehyde are emitted in much 
larger quantities than the other NATA Toxics. Predictably, both 
are significant byproducts of combustion, although formaldehyde 
tends to have a broader range of nonpoint sources, whereas 
benzene is a component of gasoline and highly correlated with 
mobile sources. 
The cancer risk data available for air toxics reinforce the 
findings from the emissions data. They are of particular value 
because they provide a direct measure of the average risks posed 
by each source category and they include census-tract level data. 
In relative and absolute terms, the cancer risks from industrial 
sources in most census tracts are quite modest, averaging about 
3 per million nationally in 2005 (the cumulative national 
average for all source categories was fifty per million).167 In 
spatial terms, about 98 percent of the U.S. population lived in 
census tracts where industrial sources were responsible for 
cancer risks below ten per million, whereas about 153,000 people 
(0.5 percent of the U.S. population) lived in census tracts where 
industrial sources (typically a steel mill or foundry) generated 
cancer risks in excess of one hundred per million. 
The risks from industrial sources can also be evaluated using 
a combination of absolute and relative metrics. For example, one 
could single out census tracts in which industrial emissions of 
air toxics generated cancer risks of least twenty per million and 
accounted for more than 30 percent of the cumulative excess 
cancer risks. Using this conservative combination of metrics, just 
240 census tracts out of 65,000 nationally would have qualified 
in 2005. To put this in a broader perspective, cancer risks from 
industrial sources exceeded five per million (10 percent of the 
national average) in just 6 percent of all census tracts (3792 in 
total).168 These results highlight the degree to which small 
 
166.   Arguably the most important one is chromium, as industrial sources 
(particularly steel mills and foundries) account for a little more than 80 percent 
of chromium emissions nationally. Id. at 321. 
167.   NATA SUMMARY, supra note 140, at 4. 
168.  In terms of absolute emissions, there are roughly 2,850 facilities 
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sources dominate emissions of air toxics nationally. 
Second, motor vehicles and nonpoint sources account for an 
even higher share of the criteria pollutants and air toxics 
emitted in large metropolitan areas. Typically their share is 
above 80 percent, whereas industrial sources generally account 
for 6 to 15 percent of NOx emissions, 15 to 30 percent of PM2.5 
emissions, and less than 10 percent of VOC emissions.169 
Further, the departures from these levels, which occur most 
often with NOx and PM2.5, are almost invariably associated with 
large coal-fired power plants. The consistency of the data and 
simple logic of the outliers lend additional credence to the overall 



























The patterns of urban emissions of NATA Toxics are a little 
more variable. Figure 5 displays the source-category emissions 
for the counties with the highest emissions levels. It shows a 
steep drop in emissions across the top four or five counties, all of 
 
nationally that emit more than 1,000 pounds of carcinogens per year (about 
three pounds per day), and they are located in about 2,250 census tracts. 
169.   As the industrial capital of the United States, Houston provides a 
conservative benchmark, and yet its industrial sources emitted just 30 percent 
of the NOx, 27 percent of the PM2.5, and 22 percent of the VOCs. 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 43 
which cover major metropolitan areas (e.g., Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Houston). Emissions from industrial sources are 
reflected in the top segment of each bar and, for all but Houston, 
account for less than 10 percent of the aggregate emissions. 
Houston, as shown later, is notable for having—by a huge 
margin—the largest concentration of industrial facilities in the 
country.170 Thus, the fact that industrial sources in Houston 
accounted for only a quarter of the NATA Toxics emitted is 
further evidence that small sources have the greatest impact on 




























The county data for criteria pollutants and air toxics must be 
interpreted carefully, however, as counties vary greatly in size. 
For example New York County (Manhattan) encompasses a mere 
twenty-three square miles but has a population of 1.6 million, 
which equates to 71,000 people per square mile. Toward the 
other end of the spectrum, the county in which Houston is 
located (Harris county) encompasses 1,729 square miles and has 
 
170.   See infra pp. 289-291 for further discussion. 
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a population of 4.1 million, which equates to 2,367 people per 
square mile. Yet, the geographic variation notwithstanding, 
metropolitan areas with the highest emissions are generally the 
places most likely to be in nonattainment for one or more 
NAAQS and to have the highest excess cancer risks. 
C. Urban Density and Air Quality 
Ambient levels of criteria pollutants vary dramatically across 
the country, but the highest levels occur disproportionately in 
large urban areas.171 Figure 6 displays the counties in 
nonattainment for ozone and small particulate matter (PM2.5), 
which are the criteria pollutants that affect the largest number 
of people and are associated with the greatest cumulative health 
risks. The relatively small number of areas in nonattainment 
obscures the large size of the affected population—123 million 
people, or about 40 percent of the U.S. population, for ozone and 
91 million, or about 30 percent of the U.S. population, for PM2.5. 
The aggregate population in nonattainment areas for all six 
criteria pollutants is almost 150 million, which represented 
about half of the U.S. population in 2005. 
 
171.   EPA provides data only on whether a county is in nonattainment for 
one or more NAAQS. While not a direct measure of risk, this classification 
indicates that criteria pollutants are at levels EPA deems harmful to public 
health. 
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FIGURE 6: NON-ATTAINMENT AREAS FOR THE CRITERIA POLLUTANTS OZONE AND 
PM2.5 







The strong correlation between high ambient levels of criteria 
pollutants and urbanization explains the divergence between 
population and geographic area—almost every nonattainment 
area, aside from California’s Central Valley, encompasses a 
major metropolitan center. The cities in California, Texas, and 
the northeastern states, which are home to many of the largest 
cities in the country, stand out as areas of poor air quality for 
criteria pollutants. A quantitative measure of this geographic 
pattern is provided in Figure 7, which displays the populations of 
nonattainment areas by state. This grouping of the data also 
underscores the extent to which elevated levels of criteria 
pollutants are concentrated in a few states. 
Ambient levels of air toxics, and the cancer risks associated 
with them, likewise vary across the country. Figure 8 displays 
the populations, at the census-tract level,172 exposed to different 
 
172.   The census tract data mitigate the problem with county-level data of 
variable size, as census tracks in urban areas typically have an area of about 
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levels of cancer risks from NATA Toxics in 2005. While about 90 
percent of the U.S. population was exposed to excess cancer risks 
of 20 to 80 per million, the distribution has a long tail that 
extends above 200 per million. In this tail of the distribution, 16 



























Most of the people who are exposed to these elevated cancer 
risks live in urban areas. In the ten largest cities, which were 
home to about 27 percent of the U.S. population in 2005, the 
average excess cancer risk from all outdoor sources of air toxics 
was 68 per million (by contrast, the cancer risks from industrial 
sources in these cities averaged about 2 per million). More 
importantly, the most severe risks from air pollution are 
concentrated in the largest cities: 88 percent of the 16 million 
people subjected to cancer risks above 100 per million—a level 
EPA deems clearly unacceptable—live in the ten largest 
 
two square miles. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 27–28. This general rule 
does not, however, hold for rural areas, where census tracts can have much 
larger areas. 







































































































Cancer Risk (mortality per million)
Figure 8: Population Distribution of Cancer Risks from Air Toxics
 
 
At the other end of the distribution, only about 40 thousand 
people lived in census tracts where cumulative excess cancer 
risks from NATA Toxics were below 10 per million.174 Moreover, 
these estimates represent a lower bound on cancer risks, as they 
are based on a subset of all air pollutants. This result reveals 
that cancer risks from air toxics exceed EPA’s target risk of one 
per million by tenfold even in very remote areas of the 
country.175 An important implication of this finding is that 
background risks from air toxics, whether from natural or 
distant anthropogenic sources, are responsible for a baseline 
 
173.   See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2012). 
174.   “NATA estimates that all 285 million people in the U.S. have an 
increased cancer risk of greater than 10 in one million.”  NATA SUMMARY, supra 
note 140, at 4. I calculated that about 39,000 people live in census tracts with 
cancer risks between 7 and 10 per million. 
175.   See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2012). See also NAT’L ASS’N OF CLEAN AIR 
AGENCIES, CLEANER CARS, CLEANER FUEL, CLEANER AIR: THE NEED FOR AND 
BENEFITS OF TIER 3 VEHICLE AND FUEL REGULATIONS 2 (Oct. 2011) (observing 
that “every person in the U.S. has an increased cancer risk of over 10 in one 
million . . . and the majority of compounds that cause this risk comes from motor 
vehicles”). 
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excess cancer risk of roughly 10 per million that cannot be 
influenced by local regulatory efforts. 






































Figure 9 displays census-tract-level data on the excess cancer 
risks from air toxics.176 While elevated cancer risks are closely 
associated with urban areas, the impacts from industrial sources 
and inter-jurisdictional transport of air toxics is evident in the 
rural areas of the southeastern states. However, unlike the 
largest metropolitan areas, the cancer risks in virtually all of 
these areas still fall within the range of 40 to 70 per million, 
making them comparable to the national average of 50 per 
million. These results further illustrate the significance of the 
background sources and risks noted above. 
 
176.   The data in Figure 9 are displayed at the county level, but the excess 
cancer risks displayed are based on the census tract in each county with the 
highest cumulative cancer risk. This representation of the data mitigates the 
averaging effects of county-level data and visually highlights the areas with the 
highest cancer risks. 
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Similar to the observations for criteria pollutants, California 
and New York stand out as hotspots for toxic air pollutants. 
Figure 10 displays the aggregate state populations of census 
tracts with excess cancer risks above 100 per million for NATA 
Toxics.177 While the number of people affected is collectively 
much smaller than the population living in nonattainment areas 
nationally,178 the geographic concentration is far more skewed 
towards large urban areas. The results expose the extreme 
geographic concentration of the populations most impacted by 





















Figure 10: Populations Exposed to Cancer Risks above 100 per Million
 
 
An obvious implication of this analysis is that while a great 
majority of the land area in the country has relatively good air 
 
177.   The states displayed in Figure 10 encompass 99 percent of the 
population exposed nationally to greater than a 100 per million excess cancer 
risk from air toxics. 
178.   If the analysis of nonattainment areas is limited to counties with 
highest ozone levels, areas categorized as “extreme” or “severe,” the geographic 
distribution is similarly skewed. All of the extreme areas are in southern 
California, and the severe areas are all associated with major metropolitan 
areas (e.g., Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Houston, New York, Philadelphia, 
Washington, D.C.). 
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quality, a large fraction of the population does not benefit from it 
because about 84 percent of the U.S. population lives in urban 
areas. This finding is also consistent with the observation that 
about 50 percent of Americans live in areas not meeting one or 
more NAAQS and that 88 percent of the population subjected to 
the highest excess cancer risks from air toxics live in one of the 
ten largest U.S. cities.179 
D. Outliers and Hotspots of Industrial Emissions 
Any discussion of industrial sources must be conditioned on 
the recognition that they typically generate a small fraction of 
the air pollutants emitted. As noted above, industrial sources 
account for about 13 percent of the air toxics emitted,180 and for 
facilities other than coal-fired power plants, a lower percentage 
of criteria pollutants. Nevertheless, in certain jurisdictions they 
can dominate emissions of specific pollutants—chromium 
emissions from steel mills, for example, are significant in areas 
of the Midwest and south.181 Outside these relatively rare 
instances,182 however, emissions from industrial facilities are 
obscured by those from other source categories and therefore 
must be examined separately. 
The dominance of emissions from electric utilities is the most 
salient observation from Figure 11, which displays the 
percentages of emissions of criteria pollutants by industrial 
source category. With the exception of VOC emissions,183 the 
skewed nature of industrial emissions extends beyond electric 
utilities. The top five industries emitted more than 90 percent of 
the emissions for each of the other criteria pollutants, and 
electric utilities and industrial boilers together accounted for 90 
 
179.   See PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 4 (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf (stating that almost 
84 percent of the U.S. population lives in urban metropolitan areas). 
180.   Adelman, supra note 149, at 317. 
181.   Id. at 320-21. 
182.   Id. 
183.   No single industry accounted for more than 20 percent of total VOC 
emissions and most of them much less. 
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percent of the SO2, 82 percent of the NOx, and 63 percent of the 
PM2.5 emitted nationally. Industrial emissions of air toxics are 
also skewed towards a subset of industries, with the top five 
industries accounting for more than 85 percent of the NATA 
Toxics emitted nationally in 2010. 



























































The geographic distribution of industrial emissions of criteria 
pollutants is divided between the flatter pattern observed for 
VOCs versus the skewed patterns found for SO2, PM2.5, and NOX 
(see Figure 12).184 Emissions of the latter three pollutants 
essentially tracked the locations of their most prominent 
sources—coal-fired power plants. The top four states, for 
example, each have significant numbers of coal-fired power 
plants and among the largest plants in the country.185 Thus, 
although industrial emissions of most criteria pollutants are 
 
184.   The relatively low levels of emissions for PM2.5 and VOCs obscure the 
variation in the data across these criteria pollutants, but a separate review of 
the data for PM2.5 reveals that it is roughly consistent with the patterns for SO2 
and NOx. 
185.   Brian H. Potts, The Court Kills EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule – 
But Which States Really Won?, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 36, 41-43 (2012) (analyzing 
the states with the largest emissions from power plants). 
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dominated by electric utilities, outside the Midwest the sources 



























Figure 13 depicts the largest industrial sources of NATA 
Toxics. It highlights the degree to which NATA Toxics are 
concentrated in the Midwestern and Southern states, as well as 
the small number of large industrial sources in the western and 
northeastern parts of the country. This map is almost a negative 
image of Figures 6 and 9, which display the nonattainment areas 
for ozone and PM2.5 and the overall excess cancer risks (i.e., all 
source categories) from NATA Toxics, respectively. Figure 13 
demonstrates that industrial emissions of air toxics are weakly 
correlated with high levels of air toxics in large urban areas. 
The regional disparities evident in the national data for 
industrial sources are amplified by the aggregate state-level 
figures (see Figure 14). Industrial sources of air toxics are 
clustered in a few states and counties,186 but Texas stands out 
 
186.   Approximately 75 percent of NATA Toxics emitted by industrial sources 
are concentrated in 15 states, and more than 90 percent of industrial emissions 
occur in just 300 counties (ten percent of the number nationally). 
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above all of the rest with more than double the emissions of 
second place Louisiana. Moreover, the distribution of industrial 
emissions has remained consistent over roughly the past two 
decades—Texas has accounted for about 15 percent of the NATA 
Toxics emitted nationally since 1988. The Houston area (Harris 
County), however, is an outlier even for Texas—county-wide 
emissions of NATA Toxics exceeded those in all but two states 
and equaled those of second-place Louisiana (see Figure 14).187 










The geographic clustering of major industrial sources extends 
to the local level in other areas as well. In both Texas and 
Louisiana, industrial emissions of air toxics in three cities 
 
187.   In 2010 Texas had 352 major facilities emitting NATA Toxics, whereas 
Ohio had 242, Pennsylvania had 210, California 189, Illinois 178, New York 
165, and Indiana 165. Moreover, while all of these states lost facilities after 
2002, Texas lost them at a lower rate and has experienced growth since 2010. 
188.   The map displays industrial sources with annual emissions of NATA 
Toxics greater than 25,000 pounds; about 260 facilities nationally meet this 
criterion. 
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collectively accounted for about 60 percent of the statewide 
total,189 and similar patterns, though less extreme, are observed 
in other states with high emissions from industrial sources.190 
Texas and Louisiana therefore had both the highest aggregate 
emissions from industrial sources in 2010 and the highest 























Figure 14: Industrial Source Emissions of NATA Toxics by State  
 
 
The data on industrial sources are remarkable for their 
consistency. With the exception of VOCs, industrial emissions of 
criteria pollutants are dominated by coal-fired power plants, 
which are loosely centered in several Midwestern states. 
Similarly, industrial sources of air toxics are concentrated in a 
small number of states that, with a few exceptions (Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Pittsburgh) are located in the southeast. Texas and 
Louisiana stand out among these states; yet, mobile and 
 
189.  It is important to remember that quantity does not track strictly with 
risk; emissions of highly toxic emissions (such as chromium) in relatively small 
amounts can pose significant risks. Madeleine Strum et al., Projection of 
Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions to Future Years, 366 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 590, 
597–98 (2006). 
190.   Other states with high emissions include Indiana, Illinois, and 
Alabama, and in each case the state’s top three municipalities accounted for 
about forty-five percent of the state total. 
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nonpoint sources still account for a majority of the air toxics 
emitted in each state. The Houston area is exemplary in this 
respect—nonpoint and mobile sources dominate cumulative 
emissions of air toxics in the industrial capital of the country. 
This singular result highlights the degree to which air pollution 
is a problem for which we are all responsible. 
The EPA data collectively provide a global picture of the many 
sources of air pollution and their geographic distribution. The 
small relative contributions of industrial facilities—other than 
coal-fired power plants—and the dominance of nonpoint and 
mobile sources are evident in virtually all of the data for criteria 
pollutants and air toxics. These patterns recur whether one 
evaluates source contributions in terms of emissions levels or 
risks, and they persist at geographic scales ranging from census 
tracts to the nation as a whole. 
The prevalence of emissions from small sources exposes the 
disconnect between reality and the prevailing focus on large 
industries in scholarship on environmental federalism. 
Moreover, while the importance of emissions from motor vehicles 
is widely recognized, direct federal regulation of emissions from 
motor vehicles has been uncontroversial (owing to their 
interstate movement and national market), and thus has not 
figured prominently in the scholarly debate. At the same time, 
the lack of data on emissions from nonpoint sources, which have 
not emerged until relatively recently, has greatly reduced their 
visibility and consideration by academics. The EPA data 
demonstrate the importance of this oversight—environmental 
federalism is built on an inverted view of source emissions that 
has distorted understanding about the prominence of public 
choice dynamics. This divergence is made more acute by the 
qualitative differences between large and small sources and the 
strong association of poor air quality with urbanization. 
III. 
THE LIMITS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
The NAAQS program and its system of cooperative federalism 
are considered to be the cornerstone of the CAA and integral to 
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its many successes.191 However, the literatures on the CAA and 
cooperative federalism have done little to connect their accounts 
of the law to the realities of its implementation. This section will 
examine the implications of the divide between conventional 
views about the CAA and the operation of the statute in practice. 
It will show that the public choice justifications (i.e., regulatory 
races to the bottom, agency capture) favored by academics for 
justifying federal intervention are either inapplicable or 
substantially weaker than often presumed. Further, while other 
grounds exist for federal regulation, notably interstate transport 
of air pollutants, this section will argue that the dominance of 
small sources elevates the importance of local regulation and 
alters the justifications for federal interventions. 
Scholarship on environmental federalism is divided into two 
primary schools. The first is based on the “matching principle” 
derived from classical economics, which holds that regulation 
should occur at the lowest level of government for which its costs 
and benefits are fully internalized.192 The second school, 
“dynamic federalism,” rejects the view that an optimal level of 
government exists for setting regulations and argues instead for 
strong, overlapping state and federal jurisdiction.193 Despite 
their differences, both schools rely heavily on the insights of 
 
191.   See, e.g., Grodsky, supra note 8, at 201. 
192.   See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1210, 2015-16 (explaining the 
theoretical underpinnings of the classical school); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan 
R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating 
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) 
(describing this rule as the “matching principle”); Esty, supra note 1, at 587. 
Some scholars also acknowledge that federal regulation may be appropriate for 
certain intrastate environmental problems, such as when state standards are 
sub-optimally lax due to the influence of powerful business interests or when 
competition between states for mobile industries precipitates a “race-to-the-
bottom” in standard setting among states. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1210, 2015-
16. 
193.   Dynamic federalism is premised on the benefits of overlapping 
jurisdiction—innovation, plurality, dialogue, and redundancy—offsetting the 
loss of uniformity, finality and accountability. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, 
Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 296 (2005); 
Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’ Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133 (2006); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 108, 114, 122-26 (2005). 
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public choice theory194 while accepting the virtues of state-level 
regulation in light of the greater local knowledge and political 
accountability of state versus federal officials.195 The discussion 
that follows will show that the reliance of the prevailing theories 
on public choice theory should be reevaluated given the 
importance of small sources. 
The leading theories of environmental federalism also miss 
critical shortcomings of the CAA’s system of cooperative 
federalism.196 Among proponents of the classical school, the 
shared framework is never efficient because it violates the 
matching principle by compromising state or federal authority 
depending on whether the issue is local or national in scope.197 
For advocates of the dynamic school, cooperative federalism falls 
short because federal regulations are often so detailed that they 
effectively preclude states from experimenting with alternative 
 
194.   See, e.g., Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 1, at 1210-12; Richard 
O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 245 
(1974); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental law, 50 EMORY L.J. 178-79 (2006) (observing that “[i]f interest 
groups succeed in negatively influencing a policy initiative at the federal level, 
under a dynamic system of federalism, the states still have a shot at correcting 
the ultimate policy result”); Buzbee, supra note 193, at 125. 
195.   Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 1, at 1222 (arguing from the 
classical school that “[g]iven our system of federalism, in which state and local 
governments have broad police powers, . . . there ought to be an affirmative 
justification for federal intervention”); Kirsten H. Engel and Scott R. Saleska, 
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 209 (2005) (highlighting the value of state regulatory 
authority even for a global environmental problem such as climate change). 
196.   Recall that under cooperative federalism, state programs must adopt 
environmental standards at least as stringent as the federal standards, and the 
federal government retains oversight authority to ensure that states effectively 
implement them. EME Homer City Generation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 
7, 12, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
197.   Joseph F. Zimmerman, Nation-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism 
in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 24-25 (Spring 2001) (arguing 
cooperative federalism increases complexity and undermines accountability); 
Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 608 
(2000) (criticizing cooperative federalism and suggesting that regulatory 
programs should be controlled either by the federal or state governments); 
Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215 (arguing that cooperative federalism’s reliance on 
state implementation can impede federal action on environmental problems of 
truly national scope). 
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approaches.198 Viewed through either the classical or dynamic 
theories, cooperative federalism sacrifices either too much 
efficiency or too much diversity and innovation. This section will 
show that neither school is attentive to the overlapping 
programs and systemic barriers that have undermined clean air 
policy and constrained cooperative federalism under the CAA. 
The persistent neglect of small sources is in part a product of 
the dearth of empirical work on state and federal programs. 
Most studies have focused either on the variation in enforcement 
levels across states or the transfer of individual state-level 
innovations vertically to the federal level or horizontally between 
states.199 Further, there has been little analysis in the legal 
literature on the relative efficacy of federal and state programs. 
Yet, this information has direct relevance to questions of efficacy 
and whether a diversity of approaches and regulatory 
innovations have meaningful impacts. The next section examines 
different lines of empirical evidence relevant to assessing the 
implementation of the CAA, while the implications for 
environmental federalism and the CAA are discussed in the 
section that follows it. 
A. The Dependence of State Clean Air Programs on Federal 
Regulations 
The distribution of air emissions across source categories (e.g., 
mobile, small stationary, industrial) bounds state action under 
the CAA’s framework for cooperative federalism. Experience 
shows that where states have broad authority to regulate, they 
 
198.   See, e.g., Robert Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative 
Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law And Policy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 719, 800-803 (2006) (arguing that cooperative federalism binds 
the hands of both the federal government and the states). Nevertheless, some 
scholars sympathetic to the dynamic framework cite cooperative federalism 
approvingly, although with some qualifications. See Buzbee, supra note 193, at 
114, 122; Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 193, 
at 284-85. 
199.   Evan J. Ringquist & David H. Clark, Issue Definition and the Politics of 
States Environmental Justice Policy Adoption, 25 INT’L. J. PUB. ADMIN. 351, 364 
(2002); B. Dan Wood, Federalism and Policy Responsiveness: The Clean Air 
Case, 53 J. POL. 851, 851 (1991); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do 
States Race to the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335, 338-39 (2001). 
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tend to be most limited by public opposition and administrative 
barriers. This observation is found to be consistent with 
independent empirical studies on the effectiveness of state 
implementation plans under the NAAQS program and national 
trends in emissions reductions. Taken together, these studies 
and the empirical findings described above provide strong 
evidence that federal programs are driving most of the 
reductions in criteria pollutants. 
Motor vehicles. Emissions from motor vehicles account for a 
majority of CO and NOx emissions, and more than a third of 
VOC emissions. Yet with the exception of California (and 
derivatively states that choose to adopt California’s standards), 
only the federal government can set emissions standards for 
motor vehicles.200 Most states are thus limited to regulating 
emissions indirectly through transportation planning and 
incentive programs,201 which have been subject to significant 
public opposition since the backlash against transportation 
policies in the 1970s. Consequently, experience with 
transportation policies has been marked largely by failure,202 
 
200.   The authority California has to set emissions standards for motor 
vehicles has been of great practical importance to air quality in the state, as 
well as the fourteen other states that have adopted the California standards. 
This exception merely demonstrates that state programs can be successful when 
they have the authority to regulate sources with significant emissions and for 
which viable regulatory options exist. In the case of California, its success may 
also be attributable to the widespread nature of severe air pollution in the state 
and the geographically broad public support for state action. In most other 
states, nonattainment areas are centered around metropolitan areas, suggesting 
that the political support for regulating air pollution is likely to be less 
consistent. 
201.   Wahrman, supra note 21, at 193 (stating that “[i]n contrast to 
stationary sources, state power to limit emissions from mobile sources is 
restricted, even though mobile sources contribute significantly to ambient air 
quality violations”). 
202.   Wahrman, supra note 21, at 191-92 (finding that the more aggressive 
transportation measures in the 1990 Amendments to the CAA have “not 
resulted in significant motor vehicle emission reductions”); Mintz, supra note 
21, at 167, 191 (stating that TCMs “have proved much more difficult to 
implement than emissions controls”). Even inspection and maintenance 
programs, which are cost-effective, have been contentious and often undermined 
by public opposition. Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the 
Air: Some Difficulties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 
27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1652 (1996) (concluding that “[p]erhaps the clearest lesson of 
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with few successful programs and states still struggling to 
identify cost-effective transportation control measures (TCMs).203 
In a recent survey, state regulators indicated that the role of 
TCMs is “‘small, minor, or very small’—in the range of 1-3% of 
needed reductions for attainment.”204 They also “complain[ed] 
that their [regulatory] toolbox is filled with high-cost or 
politically unacceptable approaches, whereas “technology-based 
measures [are the] most cost-effective and promising.”205 The 
central dilemma for state policymakers is that the TCMs with 
the greatest promise—gasoline taxes, mileage-based registration 
fees, congestion pricing—continue to be nonstarters politically.206 
A telling indicator of this impasse is that, rather than adopting 
measures to reduce vehicle-miles traveled or constructing new 
mass transit systems, the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for 
meeting the NAAQS in California and New York have 
emphasized deployment of low- and zero-emissions vehicles.207 
Nonpoint sources. Emissions from nonpoint sources account 
for a majority of VOC and PM2.5 emissions, as well as a quarter 
of CO emissions.208 States possess broad authority to regulate 
 
the history of state implementation of I/M programs is that there are generally 
no adverse consequences for states that thumb their noses at EPA and refuse to 
take the appropriate implementation steps”); HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 
21, at 18. 
203.   HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 21, at 16-17 (reporting on a survey of 
state officials who said that they were “scraping the barrel” to identify TCMs 
that would enable them to meet the ozone NAAQS and that they had difficulties 
“identifying cost-effective TCMs”). After noting that these problems were not 
limited to their case study, the authors cite a respondent who “indicated that 
other than more aggressive measures (e.g., no-drive days), no significant 
reductions can result from TCM implementation. Id. 
204.   Id. at 18. 
205.   Id. at 16-17. 
206.   Id. at 18, 33 (noting that such programs are “very unpopular, and one of 
the greatest unsolved problems of transportation policy analysis is devising a 
politically acceptable incentives-based program to deal with the social costs of 
vehicle use”). See generally Mintz, supra note 21, at 206 (discussing the failure 
of the federal government’s program to promote congestion pricing nationally). 
207.   Mintz, supra note 21, at 185, 188 
208.   The diffuse nature of nonpoint sources is illustrated by those with the 
largest emissions nationally in 2005: (1) CO – residential fireplaces and 
woodstoves, wildfires, agricultural field burning, and opening burning of waste 
(fifty percent of emissions were from “miscellaneous sources”); (2) PM2.5 – 
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nonpoint sources, but difficult politics and administrative 
barriers have impeded state regulation, although accurate 
assessment is difficult given the dearth of information.209 
Regulators have openly acknowledged the difficulties of 
regulating nonpoint sources, particularly the administrative 
challenges involved in developing standards for a “diversity of 
sources” and the need to have multiple control strategies.210 A 
2004 report on “Air Quality Management” issued by the National 
Research Council provides a clear-eyed and cautionary 
statement on current efforts to regulate nonpoint sources: 
To date, the efforts to control [nonpoint] sources have been 
relatively scattered and have slipped far behind mandated 
implementation schedules . . . . However, in the absence of a 
 
unpaved roads, crop tilling and livestock dust, residential fireplaces, 
agricultural field burning, and open burning of waste; NOx – fuel combustion 
(commercial/institutional facilities, small-scale industrial boilers, residential 
properties), waste disposal, and in certain states (i.e., TX, CA) oil and gas 
production; and (3) VOCs – solvent emissions, industrial surface coating, gas 
stations, architectural surface coating/paint emissions, wildfires, and residential 
fireplaces. In large urban areas, the mix of nonpoint sources varies 
substantially, but nonpoint sources that are often prominent include the 
following: (1) PM2.5 – restaurants, construction, unpaved roads, industrial 
boilers, waste disposal, and residential fireplaces; and (2) VOCs – consumer 
products, surface coating companies, architectural surface coating/paint 
emissions, gas stations, degreasing, and waste disposal. Other than residential 
fuel combustion, aggregate emissions of NOx are low from nonpoint sources. 
209.   Similar problems have been observed for nonpoint sources of air toxics, 
which have suffered from chronic inattention and delays in issuing standards 
for more than a decade. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, KEY ACTIVITIES IN EPA’S INTEGRATED URBAN AIR TOXICS STRATEGY 
REMAIN UNIMPLEMENTED 5-6 (June 2010) (describing the regulatory delays and 
the failure to finalize standards for most area sources until after 2006); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 157, at 23 (noting that “the 
challenges in regulating small stationary sources center on the difficulty in 
characterizing the large number of widely dispersed  facilities . . . . [In addition,] 
owners and operators of these sources have limited resources to implement 
regulations and will require extensive outreach and compliance assistance”). 
210.   Maximilian Auffhammer et al., The City-Level Effects of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act, 87 LAND ECON. 1, 5 (2011); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 213 (2004) (noting that “the 
major impediment to making progress on area-source emissions arises from the 
large number of uncertainties associated with emission inventories for these 
sources. Specific challenges include the many sources in any given category and 
the wide variation in the conditions and operating practices under which the 
emissions can occur”). 
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high-quality inventory of such sources, it is nearly impossible 
to quantify their emission contributions and to set priorities. 
Yet, those few analyses that have been done . . . suggest that 
[nonpoint]-source emissions are significant and will be even 
more important [in the future].211 
Industrial sources. While industrial sources typically account 
for a small fraction of most criteria pollutants, they dominate 
emissions for SO2 and generate more substantial levels of NOx, 
and PM2.5. The fraction of industrial emissions effectively within 
the control of states, however, is also limited by federal 
programs. Electric utilities account for a majority of the 
industrial emissions of SO2, but electric utilities are subject to 
direct federal regulation under several pollution trading 
programs.212 State regulation of industrial sources is further 
constrained by the New Source Review (NSR) program, which 
covers new or modified industrial sources in nonattainment 
areas.213 The NSR program has two components: (1) strict 
technology-based standards, which are set on a facility-by-
facility basis by the state;214 and (2) the requirement that new or 
modified sources offset their emissions of criteria pollutants.215 
Both provisions limit state discretion, but the offset 
requirements have had the greatest impact.216 This is in part 
because offsets have a ripple effect that grows as the pool of low-
cost offsets shrinks overtime, forcing industrial sources to 
purchase costly offsets or meet stringent restrictions while 
 
211.   NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 210, at 212-14. 
212.   Potts, supra note 185, at 36-39. 
213.   42 U.S.C. § 7503 (2012). 
214.   The federal NSPS program limits state discretion indirectly by 
operating as a minimum standard for facilities covered under the NSR and PSD 
programs. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & DAVID P. NOVELLO, THE CLEAN AIR 
HANDBOOK 300 (2004). 
215.   In the most severely polluted areas, offsets in existing emissions must 
be greater than one-to-one. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7512, 7513 (2012). In practice, 
offsets are obtained through bilateral agreements with the owners of existing 
sources who have reduced their facility’s emissions. 
216.   Interview with Joel H. Mack and Claudia M. O’Brien of Latham & 
Watkins (Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Mack & O’Brien Interview] (describing 
shortages of offsets for VOCs in Houston and NOx and VOCs in Los Angeles). 
These attorneys have extensive experience obtaining CAA permits and offsets 
for major industrial facilities in California and Texas. 
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controls on motor vehicles and nonpoint sources remain 
relatively lax.217 
Preemptive or overlapping federal regulatory authority 
compounds the political and administrative constraints to 
narrow dramatically the viable regulatory options for state 
agencies. The limits on state action can be roughly quantified: 
mobile and nonpoint sources alone account for most of the 
criteria pollutants emitted nationally—96 percent of CO, 68 
percent of NOx, 92 percent of VOC, and 83 percent of PM2.5. If 
emissions from electric utilities are added to these totals, 
collectively this combination of sources accounts for roughly 85 
to 95 percent of the key criteria pollutants emitted annually.218 
The end result is that most emissions of criteria pollutants are 
either effectively beyond state control or in practice have proven 
exceptionally difficult to regulate.219 Moreover, these national 
averages represent lower bounds for most metropolitan areas 
suffering from poor air quality and in nonattainment for one or 
more NAAQS. 
The influence of these structural and practical barriers is 
evident in empirical studies of the SIP implementation process. 
Several studies have analyzed correlations between the 
nonattainment status of a county and the rates at which air 
quality improves. While a few have found statistically significant 
correlations,220 a representative finding is that nonattainment 
 
217.   Mintz, supra note 21, at 183 (stating that the NSR offset requirement 
“makes it very difficult for new industry to locate in [extreme ozone areas]”). 
218.   The specific percentages of aggregate emissions are as follows: 97 
percent of CO, 87 percent of NOx, 92 percent of VOC, 92 percent of PM2.5, and 86 
percent of SO2. 
219.   The Bay Area Air Quality Management District in northern California 
is explicit about the jurisdictional limits of its regulatory authority. According to 
its 2010 Clean Air Plan, the district’s regulatory authority covers 14 percent of 
NOx emissions, 33 percent of VOCs, and 51 percent of PM2.5; area sources 
account for roughly 43 percent of VOC emissions and 64 percent of PM2.5 
emissions. BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, BAY AREA 2010 
CLEAN AIR PLAN 2-9 to 2-10, 2-15, 2-35 (2010), http://www.baaqmd.gov/Divisions 
/Planning-and-Research/Plans/Clean-Air-Plans.aspx. 
220.   Auffhammer et al., supra note 210, at 13-14 (finding that 
“nonattinament cities in nonattainment counties have a negative and 
statistically significant impact in explaining [reductions] in PM10”); J. Vernon 
Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulation, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 811-12 
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status is “responsible for only modest (and often not significant) 
reductions of ozone and [particulate matter].”221 A more recent 
study suggested that county-level data may obscure significant 
reductions in metropolitan areas, but even this work found only 
that “nonattainment designations at the city level account for 
7.2% of the drop in PM10.” At best, these studies present a mixed 
picture of whether nonattainment status has a material impact 
on improving air quality. 
Several researchers have attempted to evaluate the relative 
importance of federal and state programs under the CAA.222 
These studies suggest that with the exception of California, 
which benefits from having the authority to set standards for 
motor vehicles, federal programs have generated most of the 
emissions reductions.223 Focusing on regulation of ozone levels, 
researchers found that federal programs often accounted for 70 
to 80 percent of the reductions in VOC emissions, but the 
 
(1996) (finding statistically significant correlations with daily maximum 
concentrations of ozone in July, but weak or statistically insignificant efforts for 
other measures of ozone levels); Kenneth Y. Chay & Michael Greenstone, Air 
Quality, Infant Mortality, and the Clean Air Act of 1970, NBER Working Paper 
10053 31-34 (2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10053; Kenneth 
Y. Chay & Michael Greenstone, Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the 
Housing Market, 113 J. POL. ECON. 376, 400-01 (2005) (finding a statistically 
significant impact of nonattainment status on air quality of between 9 and 12 
percent). 
221.   Auffhammer et al., supra note 210, at 2. 
222.   Two studies also evaluated the analytical methods used in the SIP 
planning process to assess pollution mitigation measures, and both found them 
to be deficient. Phillip M. Roth et al., Air Quality Modeling and Decisions for 
Ozone Reduction Strategies, J. AIR WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 1558, 1571-73 (2005) 
(finding that the majority of SIP planning processes had not performed 
adequate performance evaluations and had insufficient corroborating analyses); 
James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts between 
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS 
L.J. 901, 965-66 (2005). 
223.   Andrew H. Pegues et al., Efficacy of Recent State Implementation Plans 
for 8-Hour Ozone, 62 J. AIR WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 252, 255 (2012) (finding 
California state programs account for 100 percent of the reductions in NOx and 
VOC emissions, but noting that “California presents an unique case here 
because . . . it alone has the ability to set its own mobile emissions standards”); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 210, at 217-19 (concluding that “[f]or 
most states, emission-reduction credits from federal control measures have 
represented a major fraction of the emission reductions in their respective 
SIPs”). 
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percentages were more variable across the studies (25 to 100 
percent) for NOx emissions.224 The general patterns elucidated 
by this work are captured well by a 2012 study in which the 
authors conclude that: 
The contribution of the SIP process to the improvements [in 
ozone levels] is unclear. Average improvements were steepest 
in nonattainment regions. However, among locations with 
similar ozone or NO2 levels initially, those in regions facing the 
impetus of nonattainment did not experience dramatically 
sharper trends. This is consistent with the fact that, apart 
from California, the majority of emission reductions 
documented in SIPs resulted from federal measures.225 
Finally, the impacts of state programs should be evident in the 
actual trends of emissions reductions. The data are consistent 
with the results discussed above. Reductions in emissions of 
PM2.5 have been closely associated with major industrial 
facilities (i.e., electric utilities), with declines of 35-45 percent 
between 2000 and 2012, and nonroad motor vehicles, with a 
decline of 45 percent. By contrast, nonpoint sources achieved 
reductions of 14 percent over this same period.226  The trends are 
even more skewed for NOx and VOCs. Electric utilities, 
industrial boilers, and transportation sources accounted for 99 
percent of the total reductions in NOX emissions between 2000 
 
224.   Pegues et al., supra note 223, at 255 (finding that, with the exception of 
California, federal programs typically account for 70 to 100 percent of the 
reductions in VOC and NOx emissions); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
210, at 217-19 (finding that, with the exception of California, federal programs 
account for 50 to over 90 percent of the reductions in VOC emissions and 25 to 
60 percent of the reductions in NOx emissions). In the NRC study, the state 
programs reduced NOx almost exclusively through reductions from industrial 
sources (particularly in Texas) and enhanced inspection and maintenance 
programs, which as we have seen are of uncertain efficacy in practice. 
225.   Pegues et al., supra note 223, at 260. These findings are consistent with 
anecdotal accounts of SIP implementation. See Fine & Owen, supra note 222, at 
946, 948 n.249, 959 (noting that regulatory officials in the San Joaquin valley 
“placed heavy reliance upon reductions from rules imposed by other regulatory 
entities”). 
226.   The EPA longitudinal data on criteria pollutants do not utilize the 
conventional categories of point, nonpoint, onroad vehicles, and nonroad 
vehicles; their “miscellaneous” category is closest to the nonpoint class used for 
the National Emission Inventory data. This analysis uses “miscellaneous 
sources” as a proxy for nonpoint sources. 
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and 2012. Similarly, whereas emissions of VOCs from these 
sources declined by 55 percent over this period, emissions of 
VOCs from nonpoint sources increased by over 40 percent just 
between 2005 and 2012.227 These findings—which must be read 
impressionistically because of changes in the EPA data over 
time—also suggest that the sources for which declines in 
emissions of criteria pollutants have been greatest (i.e., motor 
vehicles, electric utilities) are largely regulated under the federal 
programs. 
The emissions data, the legal and practical constraints, and 
the studies of NAAQS implementation plans present a consistent 
picture of state programs. The emissions data highlight why the 
options available to states for reducing emissions are often 
foreclosed by a combination of jurisdictional, administrative, and 
political obstacles.228 Recent empirical work is consistent with 
these results. It finds that direct federal regulations are 
responsible for much of the declines observed in ambient levels 
of criteria pollutants over the time periods studied and that the 
nonattainment status of an area has only a modest impact on 
these reductions. In short, the ongoing success of the CAA is 
largely attributable to direct federal regulation that states are 
mandated to implement as opposed to the statute’s system of 
cooperative federalism. 
B. Environmental Federalism and Public Choice Reconsidered 
The empirical results discussed above are the foundation of 
the theoretical arguments made in this section. They 
 
227.   Emissions from miscellaneous sources increased dramatically around 
2003, but this was driven by a recalibration of EPA’s emissions inventories. It is 
also worth noting that industrial processes, which include large and small 
sources, is the source category with the single largest share of VOC emissions 
(about 40 percent of the total); emissions from this class declined about 10 
percent between 2000 and 2012. 
228.   These findings are also consistent with general critiques of the SIP 
framework. See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 222, at 938-70 (chronicling the 
failure of one SIP); Arnold W. Reitz, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State 
Implementation Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 209, 357-58 (2004) (characterizing the SIP process as a “failure” 
given that many areas remained in nonattainment). 
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demonstrate that the limited effectiveness of cooperative 
federalism has little to do with the regulatory pathologies, 
particularly those associated with public choice theory, typically 
cited by academics. The principal purpose of this section is to 
reexamine the academic debate over environmental federalism 
in light of its failure to adequately take into account the 
prominence of small sources of air pollution. I will argue that 
this oversight has led both to misapplication of public choice 
theory and to a neglect of other more important barriers to 
improving air quality. My normative claim is that the dominance 
of emissions from small sources changes the justifications for 
federal regulation and thus the role that it ought to play in 
protecting air quality. 
The overreliance of the leading theories of environmental 
federalism on public choice theory is fundamental. For the 
classical school, the threats of agency capture by concentrated 
business interests and interstate competition over attracting 
large industrial plants are central to determining whether 
regulation should be elevated to the federal level. Within the 
dynamic school, they underlie its diversification strategy—
favorable politics in one state can circumvent industry opposition 
in another state. The presumed importance of large industrial 
sources reflected in these theories mirrors the tendency of the 
general public and policymakers to single them out.229 This 
predilection has been bolstered by the visibility of electric 
utilities230—no other industry figures as prominently in clean air 
policy,231 nor does any other industrial source approach the 
emissions levels or impacts of coal-fired power plants.232 
 
229.   See supra pp. 319-321 
230.   This inverted perspective is reinforced by casebooks, which focus largely 
on NAAQS and regulation of major industrial sources. See, e.g., HOLLY 
DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS 
696-723 (discussing motor vehicle regulations primarily as an example of 
technology forcing); GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 490-96, 514 (motor 
vehicle policies covered in 7 pages out of more than 150 on the Clean Air Act). 
231.   The widespread impacts of coal-fired power plants prompted the 
creation of two major programs—protections for air quality in areas complying 
with NAAQS and the first pollution trading program, which regulated SO2 
emissions associated with acid rain. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-49, 7651 (2006). 
232.   Electric utilities account for a majority of the industrial emissions for 
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The continued focus on industrial emissions not only 
marginalizes collectively more important sources of air pollution, 
it obscures the barriers to regulating diffuse sources that differ 
from those of large industrial facilities.233 Traditional concerns 
about interstate competition and agency capture simply do not 
apply to residential sources or transportation planning. 
Similarly, the risk of interstate “races to the bottom” will be 
minimal for small businesses, as they lack the economic leverage 
of large companies—threats to leave will be either implausible or 
neutralized by the presence of numerous local competitors. Nor 
do small businesses with collectively significant emissions (e.g., 
metal coating/paint shops, dry cleaners, restaurants) fit the 
conventional public choice model of “concentrated business” 
interests with high stakes in opposing regulations.234 The threat 
of agency capture in this context is, by definition, diminished 
given the number and heterogeneity of entities affected. 
The primary barriers to regulating small sources involve a 
 
three key criteria pollutants regulated under the NAAQS program, whereas no 
other industry accounts for more than a few percent. See supra pp. 287-288. 
233.   Emissions from nonpoint sources are fragmented across a broad range 
of residential and commercial sources. The EPA data show that in the major 
urban centers, where nonpoint sources are most highly concentrated, single 
classes of businesses account for less than 20 percent of the cumulative 
emissions from nonpoint sources at the county level. The exceptions to this 
general rule are rare. Representative examples include emissions of PM2.5 from 
restaurants and construction in several major cities, and emissions of VOCs 
from surface-coating companies in Chicago and from waste disposal sites in New 
York City. (Surprisingly, gas stations in the largest urban centers account for 
less than 10 percent of cumulative VOC emissions from nonpoint sources—
except for Houston, where they account for about 12 percent of the total.) 
234.   See, e.g., Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra 
note 2 at 559 (describing the public choice dynamics as involving the adoption of 
“suboptimally lax environmental standards because industry groups that favor 
less stringent regulation are small and cohesive, whereas individuals who 
support more stringent regulation are a larger and more diffuse group”); 
Stewart, supra note 1, at 1213 (“Industrial firms, developers, unions and others 
with incentives to avoid environmental controls are typically well-organized 
economic units with a large stake in particular decisions”); Kirsten H. Engel & 
Scott R. Saleska, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in 
the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental 
Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 64 (1998) (observing that 
“laws tend to respond to the wants of small, cohesive special interest groups, 
such as industry, at the expense of the wants of the larger, more diffuse public”). 
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distinct set of political and administrative challenges. As shown 
above, opposition to transportation policies and regulating small 
sources is often driven by resistance to undesirable or costly 
policies that impact the general public (e.g., fuel taxes, parking 
restrictions, regulation of woodstoves/fireplaces) or small 
businesses such as dry cleaners and restaurants.235 
Transportation planning and controlling emissions from 
residential sources, for example, implicate expensive 
infrastructure or entrenched expectations that are difficult to 
overturn through rules and sanctions alone.236 Absent effective 
public outreach, regulations that run counter to established 
norms are much more likely to incite public opposition, and 
regulatory standard setting and enforcement often will be harder 
given the number, diversity, and diffuse nature of small sources. 
Implementing regulations may be further aggravated by 
economic factors, such as limited access to capital, higher 
relative costs of emissions controls, absence of economies of 
scale, and the limited technical knowledge of the general public 
and small-business owners.237 Acceptance of new products or 
policies in this “retail” context frequently does not turn on 
narrow utilitarian criteria.238 This phenomenon lies at the center 
of academic work on adoption rates of new innovations and 
methods, which can vary dramatically regardless of their 
objective utility or social value.239 Existing norms, 
misperceptions, heuristic biases, structural impediments, and 
 
235.   See supra note 208 and accompanying text; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 210, at 212-14; Wahrman, supra note 21, at 191-92. 
236.   EVERETT M. ROGERS, THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 26 (5th ed. 2003) 
(observing that norms can be a major barrier to adoption, as they “define a 
range of tolerable behavior and serve as a guide or standard for the behavior of 
members of a social system”). 
237.   The efforts to promote the adoption of low-toxicity, water-based dry 
cleaning provide a compelling example of the added complexities often entailed 
in regulating small businesses. See Timothy F. Malloy & Peter Sinsheimer, 
Innovation, Regulation and the Selection Environment, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 
183, 189 (2004). 
238.   ROGERS, supra note 236, at 221. 
239.   Id. For example, despite both being objectively revolutionary, 
anesthesia was embraced immediately by surgeons whereas antiseptic 
techniques took decades before they were widely adopted. Atul Gawande, Slow 
Ideas, THE NEW YORKER, July 29, 2013, at 36, 37. 
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misalignment with perceived needs can stall adoption even of 
innovations that are later universally acknowledged to be of 
transformative value.240 
Clean air policies have attributes that make it especially 
difficult to overcome these forms of resistance.241 The benefits of 
discrete policies will be difficult to discern given the number of 
sources, and improvements in air quality are typically subject to 
significant time lags.242 The compatibility of policies with public 
values and experience may also be mixed, as they implicate 
competing values (e.g., freedom of movement, control over one’s 
home) and the most salient associations with air pollution 
involve industrial facilities. Clean air regulations are also mind-
numbingly complex, which impedes public understanding and 
thus acceptance. Together these barriers create a high threshold 
for states and local governments to persuade the public that 
regulation of small sources is necessary and worth the trouble. 
Finally, whereas regulation of industrial sources is centralized 
in state-level agencies, transportation planning and regulation of 
nonpoint sources are heavily reliant on local governments.243 
Transportation planning, in particular, involves a mix of local, 
state and federal agencies, and it occurs on timescales that are 
often out of sync with clean air policies.244 This fragmentation of 
 
240.   Gawande, supra note 239, at 39. The critical point here is that the 
barriers are customary, structural, and psychological, as opposed being 
associated with environmental externalities or inadequate innovation. 
241.   The primary factors that influence acceptance of new policies include (1) 
the relative benefits; (2) compatibility with existing public values, past 
experiences, and needs; (3) the degree to which they are perceived as difficult to 
understand and implement; (4) whether they can be experimented with on a 
limited basis; and (5) whether the results of a policy are observable. ROGERS, 
supra note 236, at 15-17, 221-23. 
242.   Id. at 223, (noting that the “immediacy of reward” is a significant part 
of “relative advantage,” which “explains in part why preventive innovations 
generally have an especially slow rate of adoption”). The value of small-scale 
experiments is of limited values for similar reasons. Id. 
243.   Melnick, supra note 102, at 308 (noting that “[w]hile the EPA can 
threaten privately owned stationary sources with fines and jail sentences, 
transportation policies result from the interaction of a large variety of 
government units, none solely responsible for these policies and few subject to 
traditional legal sanctions”); Wahrman, supra note 21, at 191-92; Mintz, supra 
note 21, at 167, 191; HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 21, at 18. 
244.   Melnick, supra note 102, at 308. 
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regulatory authority complicates oversight—no single entity is 
responsible—while the number and variety of regulated actors 
can overwhelm agency capacities and make effective 
enforcement politically untenable. Thus, while federal and state 
agencies can ultimately issue regulations over the objections of 
regulated industries, the history of clean air laws demonstrates 
that regulations significantly impacting the public and small 
businesses are typically much harder to implement by legal 
fiat.245 
Consideration of the barriers described above is largely absent 
from the leading theories of environmental federalism. For the 
classical school, the primary consideration is whether regulatory 
agencies internalize the environmental costs and benefits of 
their policies.246 Under this theory, the case for the NAAQS and 
its system of cooperative federalism would be tenuous, as the 
leading sources with interstate impacts (motor vehicles, electric 
utilities) are subject to direct federal regulation.247 At the same 
time, the other notable exceptions to the matching principle—
regulatory races to the bottom and agency capture—either don’t 
apply to small sources or are of secondary importance.248 
The regulatory impediments associated with small sources 
also expose the shortcomings of the classical theory’s focus on 
negative externalities. For example, the need to change public 
attitudes and to persuade small business owners, both of which 
are facilitated by peer-to-peer interactions, favor regulation at 
 
245.   ROGERS, supra note 236, at 221-23; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 157, at 23 (noting that “the challenges in regulating small 
stationary sources center on the difficulty in characterizing the large number of 
widely dispersed facilities . . . . [In addition,] owners and operators of these 
sources have limited resources to implement regulations and will require 
extensive outreach and compliance assistance”). 
246.   Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215; Butler & Macey, supra note 192, at 25; 
Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 1, at 1222. 
247.   Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 
1120, 1122-24 (1999) (arguing that in the absence of inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers the local governments are in a superior position to provide public 
goods). 
248.   In fact, public choice theory can be flipped on its head—the number of 
people impacted can be a virtue when the impacts of regulations are sufficient to 
prompt unilateral individual action and widespread. The long history of inaction 
on transportation planning is, in part, a testament to this phenomenon. 
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the local level.249 However, the benefits of such programs will not 
be solely local. Successful state-level programs will generate 
knowledge spillovers and influence regulation in neighboring 
states,250 which only the federal government will have a 
consistent interest in facilitating.251 The need for federal support 
is all the more important given the technical nature of such 
programs, the substantial investments they often require (e.g., 
costly infrastructure), and the public ambivalence towards them. 
Dynamic federalism falters by both marginalizing small 
sources and presuming that regulatory innovation is inherent to 
an open federalist system.252 In particular, the heterogeneity of 
local conditions, upon which dynamic federalism is premised, 
overlooks the commonalities of areas with the lowest air quality 
and thus the greatest incentives to innovate—high urban 
density, lack of essential infrastructure, and a predominance of 
diffuse sources. The persistent obstacles to controlling air 
pollution in urban areas are reflected in the history of clean air 
policy. Urban smoke (also associated with small sources) resisted 
regulation for decades, and in the end its decline was 
attributable more to the availability of new fuels (natural gas, 
diesel) than to regulation.253 Likewise, transportation policies 
today have failed in large part because of political and structural 
barriers in the urban centers where they are most needed.254 The 
pervasiveness of these obstacles undercuts the geographic 
diversity on which dynamic federalism is premised and stalls 
 
249.   ROGERS, supra note 236, at 18-19 (asserting that acceptance of policies 
is “a very social process” because most individuals “depend mainly upon a 
subjective evaluation of . . . other individuals like themselves,” who have similar 
“beliefs, educations, and socioeconomic status”). 
250.   Oates, supra note 247, at 1133; ROGERS, supra note 236, at 283 
(describing how “early adopter decreases uncertainty about a new idea by 
adopting it, and then conveying a subjective evaluation [it]”). Studies of policy 
diffusion have also found that “[t]he most innovative regional governments 
tended to influence their neighbors.”  Id. at 297. 
251.   Oates, supra note 247, at 133-34. 
252.   Buzbee, supra note 193, at 122-26; Engel & Saleska, supra note 195, at 
190. 
253.   See supra pp. 248-250. 
254.   HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 21, at 16 (finding strong evidence for 
“heighten[ed] concern about a toolkit empty of ways to meet transportation 
needs and air quality goals”). 
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adoption of innovative policies. 
 
The gaps in the leading schools of federalism highlight their 
complementary perspectives. The classical theory is a useful 
framework when the primary goal is static efficiency and the 
regulatory options are well established; the dynamic theory is 
most useful when developing new policies or when   
experimenting with new technologies is the primary objective 
and sufficient heterogeneity of local conditions (i.e., political, 
socioeconomic, environmental) exists nationally. Neither theory 
addresses the distinctive political and systemic barriers that are 
endemic to regulating small sources of air pollution, which fail to 
fit consistently within the framework of the matching principle 
under the classical theory or to generate the local 
experimentation and model programs on which the dynamic 
theory is premised. 
The preceding arguments are reinforced by the heterogeneity 
across small sources of air pollution. Small sources with 
collectively the largest emissions can be grouped into four basic 
categories: (1) consumer products (solvents, paints, cleaning 
products); (2) residential combustion (woodstoves, fireplaces, 
water heaters); (3) small businesses (dry cleaners, metal 
coating/paint shops, restaurants, waste disposal sites);255 and (4) 
transportation-related (vehicle-miles travelled not emissions 
rates). These categories encompass or implicate public and 
commercial behavior, products used locally but sold in national 
markets (solvents, woodstoves, commercial dry-cleaning 
equipment), and decisions involving local transportation and 
infrastructure (municipal zoning, highways, public parking). 
This variability further highlights the pitfalls of basing theories 
of environmental federalism on industrial sources. 
My principal objective in this section has been to show that 
barriers to regulating small sources differ in kind from those 
 
255.   Gas stations are collectively a significant source of volatile organic 
compounds and air toxics, but most of the emissions derive from evaporation of 
gasoline at the pumps and are largely covered by federal regulations. 
Evaporative losses are controlled through federal fuel standards (e.g., limits on 
benzene and sulfur content) and technology-based standards on motor vehicles 
that limit releases from gas tanks during filling. 
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commonly associated with large industrial sources and that the 
leading theories of environmental federalism do not adequately 
consider them. This oversight has led academics and 
policymakers to overstake their claims for direct federal 
regulation, including industrial sources, and to misapprehend 
the most compelling reasons for federal intervention. Both 
problems stem from a heavy reliance on public choice theory that 
ignores the predominance of small sources and the influence of 
competing regulatory constraints on state policies. Perhaps most 
striking, the long history of clean air policy suggests that 
barriers to regulation of small sources, both political and 
administrative, often trump the public choice advantages of 
large industries. 
The prominence of small sources has direct and indirect 
implications for regulatory policies at the state and federal 
levels.256 I will highlight three, two of which will be discussed in 
the next section. First, with the important exception of motor 
vehicles, the literature on clean air policy has ignored emissions 
from consumer products (e.g., cleaning products, paints, 
woodstoves, water heaters), and thus undervalued the unique 
role the federal government can play in setting national product 
standards to mitigate air emissions. Second, the persistent 
barriers described above to development and diffusion of 
effective transportation policies and small-source regulations 
highlights the need for targeted federal programs to generate 
model policies (e.g., incentives, funding, technical support). EPA 
could also be given the authority, which it currently lacks, to 
condition approval of state plans on the adoption of pilot projects 
to facilitate diffusion of such model policies. Third, the low 
relative and absolute levels of emissions from industrial sources, 
factors mitigating public choice dynamics, and interest in 
enhancing state discretion under cooperative federalism, suggest 
that federal regulation of major industrial sources under the 
 
256.   None of the observations made here alter the case for federal regulation 
of sources, most notably motor vehicles and coal-fired power plants, with 
significant interstate impacts. Other than the specific form of regulation, 
however, federal intervention on this ground has never been a significant source 
of controversy in academic or policy debates over environmental federalism. 
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PSD and NSR programs could be ended or streamlined without 
detrimentally impacting human health. I would limit this third 
proposal to use as part of a legislative compromise to achieve 
reforms necessary to address climate change and to revitalize 
the pollution-trading regimes for electric utilities. 
IV. 
REALIGNING CLEAN AIR POLICY TO REFLECT THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL 
SOURCES 
Clean air policies cover a broad mix of sources and pollutants 
with impacts that range from the local to the global. This 
heterogeneity is a primary reason that restricting regulations to 
a single level of government has been contested. There are other 
respects, however, in which air pollution follows relatively 
simple patterns. Geographically, the areas with the lowest air 
quality are centered around major urban centers. In addition, 
certain types and classes of sources dominate air emissions, and 
a handful of pollutants account for a great majority of risks to 
human health. In short, air pollution is closely associated with a 
limited number of geographic areas, source types, and 
pollutants. 
Implementation of the NAAQS program and preserving state 
discretion under cooperative federalism are shaped by these 
broad patterns. Although direct federal regulation of motor 
vehicles and electric utilities appropriately targets interstate 
sources of air pollution, it unavoidably bounds the scope of 
cooperative federalism under the NAAQS program by effectively 
removing a large fraction of total emissions from state control. 
State programs in urban areas are constrained further by the 
political and administrative challenges posed by the remaining 
sources and control strategies (i.e., nonpoint sources, 
transportation planning). Policies that ignore these structural 
and practical limits, such as the analyses required to 
demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS, can end up forcing 
federal and state agencies to devote limited resources to 
elaborate modeling exercises that have little value other than to 
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satisfy formulaic regulatory obligations.257 
Proponents of the NAAQS may concede that state 
implementation is inadequate, but they blame the EPA or state 
agencies for a failure of resolve without acknowledging the 
systemic constraints. My worry, and a central motivation for this 
Article, is that empirically unexamined beliefs about the 
NAAQS—their impacts on emissions, technology, and interstate 
competition—have become dogma that is reinforced by a view 
held among many environmental advocates that any perceived 
rollbacks in policies must be opposed. This perspective, although 
understandable in the current political climate, makes it 
exceedingly difficult to identify opportunities for compromise 
that I believe will be a precondition to needed reforms of the 
CAA and to addressing the pressing issue of climate change. 
With an acute sense of their likely divisiveness, the reforms I 
propose below are advocated as empirically and normatively 
grounded opportunities to strengthen the CAA and to enable 
compromises, with few environmental downsides, that will be 
essential to broader reforms on issues such as climate change. 
This section outlines two sets of reforms that rebalance clean 
air policies in light of the importance of small sources. First, the 
CAA’s system of cooperative federalism will continue to 
underperform unless it is refocused on stimulating the 
development of effective state-level and local policies. In short, 
rather than spreading resources across all jurisdictions failing to 
attain a NAAQS, greater emphasis should be placed on targeted 
funding of demonstration projects and facilitated transfer of 
proven policies nationally. Second, federal regulation of major 
industrial sources under the NSR and PSD programs skews 
regulatory priorities and unnecessarily limits state authority to 
select policies and allocate emissions across sources. Although 
undoubtedly controversial, a proposal to end these programs 
could be used, for example, as part of a political compromise for 
broader reforms to address climate change and to strengthen 
pollution trading programs for electric utilities without 
 
257.   WILLIAM CHAMEISES ET AL., NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 126 (2004); Roth et al., supra note 222, at 
1558. 
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negatively impacting human health. 
 
A. Reforming NAAQS Planning and Implementation Processes 
It is important to appreciate that the disparities across the 
country in air quality and challenges of meeting the NAAQS in 
urban areas were a source of conflict from the outset. In 1970, 
Congress initially left no room for balancing of any sort when it 
set unrealistic compliance deadlines and precluded EPA from 
considering costs when setting the NAAQS.258 The law put 
regulators in the dubious position of either setting a standard 
that it knew could not be met by the statutory deadlines in most 
highly populated areas or issuing a weaker standard than the 
science alone warranted. Regardless of the outcome, EPA’s 
judgment was vulnerable to attack—either based on claims that 
its standards could not be met or that it had sacrificed science to 
political or economic expediency.259 
A political compromise was struck in 1977, and expanded in 
the 1990 Amendments, that finessed the tensions in the law by 
adopting a schedule of staggered compliance deadlines.260 The 
NAAQS consequently are not, and have never been, national 
 
258.   42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
259.   See, e.g., CHAMEISES ET AL, supra note 257, at 129 (observing that 
“[s]etting unrealistic deadlines can lead to frustration for local and federal 
agencies that do not see any reasonable way to achieve the requirements of the 
act. It can also introduce an aura of fiction to the entire SIP process”); Quarles, 
Transportation Control Plans, supra note 9, at 242 (concluding that unrealistic 
requirements of the CAA “caused extraordinary turmoil to achieve little benefit 
and that in so doing the [transportation control plans] contributed substantially 
to the backlash of objection to regulation in general”); Coglianese & Marchant, 
supra note 127, at 1291-29 (complaining that “EPA’s use of science as a 
rhetorical defense helped to mask the absence of a coherent, principled account 
for why the Agency revised its ozone and particulate matter standards as it 
did”). 
260.   Ozone nonattainment areas were divided into five categories, each with 
a distinct compliance date and requirements for annual reductions in pollution 
levels. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1) (2012). Attainment areas for CO and PM10 were, 
or could have been in the case of PM10, divided into two categories (marginal 
and serious). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7512(a)(1), 7513(a)-(b) (2012). They also imposed 
enhanced requirements for certain nonattainment areas based both on the 
severity of pollution and population levels. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(3) (2012). 
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standards in practice—a point often elided in current debates.261 
Staggering the compliance deadlines, however, did not quell 
controversies over the NAAQS, as illustrated most recently by 
the Obama Administration’s decision in 2011 to delay issuance of 
a revised standard for ozone.262 Instead, the NAAQS retain the 
veneer of national standards, and the heightened political and 
economic stakes that follow, without truly operating as uniform 
standards. This was, of course, precisely the bargain that 
everyone struck. States were given time, as it turned out 
decades, to comply with the NAAQS while environmentalists 
agreed to bend on deadlines but not on the goals—they wished to 
“keep [the] goals out of reach to put constant pressure on 
regulators and polluters.”263 
This was arguably a logical strategy when industrial 
emissions represented a larger fraction of overall emissions and 
many opportunities existed for reductions. However, we do not 
now live (and may never have lived) in a world in which the 
battle is primarily a political one between industrial interests 
and public advocates. Air pollution is largely a problem for which 
we are collectively responsible. The practical consequences of 
setting unrealistic goals is evident in the SIP implementation 
process, which operates primarily to satisfy the required showing 
that state policies will lead to timely NAAQS compliance.264 A 
recent National Research Council report highlighted this issue 
when it characterized the process for developing SIPs as “overly 
bureaucratic”: 
The SIP process now mandates extensive amounts of local, 
state, and federal agency time and resources in a legalistic, 
and often frustrating, proposal and review process, which 
 
261.   Harrison & Portney, supra note 27, at 26. 
262.   President Barack H. Obama, Statement by the President on the Ozone 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-
ambient-air-quality-standards. 
263.   MELNICK, supra note 102, at 363. 
264.   Wahrman, supra note 21, at 191 (concluding that “[t]he SIP has proven 
to be an ineffective tool to improve air quality as highway construction and 
other local projects that may increase total emissions go forward and are 
incorporated in the SIP”). 
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focuses primarily on compliance with intermediate process 
steps . . . . This process probably discourages innovation and 
experimentation at the state and local levels; overtaxes the 
limited financial and human resources available to the nation’s 
[air quality management] system at the state, local, and 
federal levels; and draws attention and resources away from 
the more germane issue of ensuring progress toward the goal 
of meeting the NAAQS.265 
Consistent with these concerns, a survey conducted by 
Resources for the Future found that many state officials 
expressed concern about the time that must be dedicated to the 
SIP process.266 Moreover, beyond the costs and time for 
regulators, the duration of the SIP process and the litigation 
surrounding it can cause significant delays in abatements 
actions.267 
Realistically, it is difficult to imagine a political realignment 
that would allow for constructive reconsideration of national 
standards in their current form. Whatever the limits in practice, 
advocates have long viewed the NAAQS as EPA’s primary means 
of pressuring states to take action.268 Reforms must therefore 
work within the existing framework to empower state-level 
efforts to control emissions from all sources. Recognition that 
conventional threats to state action—interstate competition and 
agency capture—either will not apply or will be less significant 
for small sources and that the greatest obstacles to effective 
policies are systemic has the potential to lower opposition to 
 
265.   CHAMEISES ET AL, supra note 257, at 128. 
266.   HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 21, at 9, 30 (discussing the frustration 
of air quality planners associated with “time-consuming SIP revisions [for 
which] the actual air-quality benefits . . . may be minimal”); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY PROTECTION COULD POTENTIALLY BE MORE 
EFFICIENT AND BETTER LINKED 4 (April 2003) (describing the view among 
transportation planners that “the frequency with which they must [demonstrate 
conformity with SIPs] limits the time and funds available to address other 
important transportation challenges, such as alleviating congestion and 
ensuring highway safety”). 
267.   Pegues et al., supra note 223, at 253 (describing the elaborate nature of 
the SIP process and the many sources of delay, often upwards of a decade, that 
can impede abatement efforts). 
268.   Melnick, supra note 102, at 363. 
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limited reforms. This altered understanding (and decades of 
delays) could usefully weaken the prevailing faith in fixed 
statutory deadlines—the former challenges the need for them, 
the latter their efficacy. 
The arbitrary and porous nature of statutory deadlines ought 
to reduce opposition to reform. Specifically, EPA could be given 
the authority to set NAAQS compliance deadlines, and to offset 
environmentalists’ concerns about lost leverage, to condition SIP 
approval on adoption of specified programs with demonstrated 
records of success. The freedom from arbitrary deadlines would 
enable the SIP process to shift from serving bureaucratic ends to 
a focus on identifying viable policies, innovative programs, and 
jointly agreed-upon compliance schedules. EPA’s role, in 
particular, would no longer be limited to emissions accounting 
and verifying the technical validity of a SIP. This enhanced 
authority could be complemented and further leveraged by 
expanding EPA involvement in and resources for facilitating 
demonstration projects of promising policies through grants or 
other incentive-based programs.269 
The flexibility inherent in this proposal represents less of a 
departure from the status quo than someone leery of such 
reforms might initially infer. The CAA requires states to 
inventory sources of criteria pollutants and to derive model-
based estimates of the reductions needed to meet the NAAQS.270 
This information is used by the state to set emissions limits, 
which are incorporated into the SIP, for any source of criteria 
pollutants. EPA’s oversight is limited to determining whether 
proposed emissions limits will meet the NAAQS within the 
applicable statutory deadline.271 However, the complexity of the 
underlying analysis entails technical judgments that can be 
outcome determinative.272 These discretionary judgments afford 
 
269.   The now moribund Integrated Urban Air Toxics Strategy is a potential 
model for this kind of program, particularly as the areas with the worst air 
quality are overwhelmingly urban. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
NATIONAL AIR TOXICS PROGRAM: THE INTEGRATED URBAN STRATEGY 1-2 (2000). 
270.   Bachmann, supra note 9, at 686-87; 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2012). 
271.   KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 174-75. 
272.   Fine & Owen, supra note 222, at 923-24, 930-31; David Owen, 
Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265, 
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state regulators numerous opportunities to manipulate results 
(often with EPA’s apparent blessing) to avoid SIP requirements 
that would be politically unpopular or difficult to implement.273 
Accordingly, states already have substantial latitude to 
circumvent the NAAQS deadlines through arcane technical 
judgments inherent in the SIP process. 
Trading off porous statutory compliance deadlines for EPA 
authority to condition SIP approval on specific actions therefore 
could strengthen EPA’s ability to induce state action. It would 
also allow compliance deadlines to be set based on local 
conditions and through an open—and more transparent—
rulemaking process that reduces the incentives to obscure policy 
choices in technical judgments. Indeed, by reframing the public 
debate around compliance dates, this approach could increase 
public involvement, as the highly technical nature of the SIP 
review process has been a significant barrier to public 
participation.274 Public debates over the NAAQS would focus on 
two primary decision points—the setting of ambient standards, 
which would occur nationally, and the determination of 
compliance deadlines, which would occur at the state or possibly 
local level. 
This proposal replaces a putatively fixed system of tiered 
compliance deadlines with a process that openly allows for local 
 
283-84 (2009) (describing the unavoidable uncertainties in air pollution 
modeling and the weak standards EPA uses for using modeling to demonstrate 
compliance with NAAQS). 
273.   Fine & Owen, supra note 222, at 930 (stating that “air quality models 
have consistently overestimated air quality gains, and most ozone SIPs . . . have 
not yielded attainment”); Bachmann, supra note 9, at 686 (describing studies 
conducted in the late 1980s that found SIPs were undermined by “inadequate 
assumptions regarding ‘rule effectiveness’ and poor enforcement,” as well as 
“the development of ‘cheater SIPs’ that were encouraged by unreasonable 
deadlines”); David Shoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the 
Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 771-74 (1983) (observing that “EPA bent 
over backwards to approve whatever plans the states submitted”); McGarity, 
supra note 118, at 77-78 (describing EPA failure to enforce the 1996 fifteen-
percent emissions reduction targets for VOCs). 
274.   Fine & Owen, supra note 222, at 957, 967-68 (observing that “there was 
an almost complete absence of public participation from public interest groups 
or from the general public” regarding the approval of a SIP for the central valley 
in California). 
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calibration of compliance schedules. In doing so, it 
simultaneously recognizes the systemic constraints on states and 
seeks to augment EPA authority (and discretion) to promote 
state action. Beyond enhanced transparency, the principal gain 
would be greater strategic leveraging of limited resources and 
targeted development of programs that have a realistic chance of 
succeeding and serving as models for other states and localities. 
The gaps in enforcement noted above and limited effectiveness of 
the NAAQS program suggest that the leverage lost by 
abandoning statutory deadlines is likely to be modest. To the 
contrary, the history of clean air policy has demonstrated time 
and again that deadlines cannot prevail over widespread 
opposition; the only real option is to engage the public and to 
foster their acceptance of policies by demonstrating their value. 
This will be far from easy, but policies that fail to take into 
account structural limits associated with the principal sources of 
air pollution and constraints on government capacities waste 
limited resources and provide false hopes. 
B. Reevaluating the Rationales for the NSR and PSD 
Programs 
The PSD and NSR programs were originally enacted to 
supplement the NAAQS and to mitigate geographic disparities 
in regulatory burdens.275 Today support for the PSD and NSR 
programs centers on heightened concerns about major sources of 
air pollution, particularly the potential for localized hotspots or 
interstate transport of air emissions, as well as the technology-
forcing benefits and relative ease of administering the provisions 
that utilize technology-based standards.276 I will argue that the 
 
275.   Legislators in 1970 had multiple grounds for supporting them, 
including fears about the adequacy of the NAAQS (spurred by the recognition 
that many pollutants are harmful at any level of exposure), a belief that strict 
controls favored economic development (lower emissions individually would 
allow for a greater number of facilities), the limited capacity of SIPs to address 
interstate air pollution, and the capacity of technology-based standards to 
promote innovation and deployment of new technologies. Melnick, supra note 
102, at 81. 
276.   See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based 
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
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prevailing rationales are either overstated, because the potential 
effects on pollution levels will be modest, or wrong about the 
risks associated with the vast majority of industrial sources. 
There are two exceptions to these claims, both of which have 
been already highlighted as outliers—coal-fired power plants 
and the massive industrial complex in the Houston area. I will 
address each of them separately, but suffice it to say that I 
believe other measures would be more effective than the PSD 
and NSR programs. 
The evolution of regulations for industrial facilities provides a 
valuable perspective on the shifting rationales and contingencies 
motivating their enactment. Regulators originally adopted 
technology-based standards for industrial sources because 
scientists had little understanding of either the health or 
environmental impacts caused by air pollution. Policymakers in 
St. Louis selected them as a logical alternative to a risk-based 
approach in the 1930s, and regulators in Los Angeles resorted to 
them again when smog first emerged as a major problem in the 
1940s.277 Municipal agencies in both cases initially targeted 
large industrial facilities, and only later (after overcoming public 
opposition) began regulating smaller stationary and mobile 
sources. Federal regulation did not follow this trajectory; motor 
vehicles were regulated first, but industrial sources soon became 
a central focus of federal policies. 
Congress’s decision to single out industrial facilities for direct 
federal regulation was informed by its national perspective. The 
NSPS program adopted under the 1970 Amendments to the CAA 
was prompted, above all, by concerns about regional economic 
competition. Members of Congress feared that strict local 
regulations, which it assumed would be required to meet the 
NAAQS in large urban centers, would create strong incentives 
for industries to relocate to less-populated areas with good air 
 
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991). 
277.   STRADLING, supra note 36, at 164-65, 167-71; UEKOETTER, supra note 
37, at 160 (noting that governments officials “had no choice but to take 
technological possibilities as their starting point” due to limited knowledge of 
the risks); KRIER & URSIN, supra note 5, at 60-61, 66. 
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quality.278 The NSPS program was designed to mitigate inter-
jurisdictional regulatory disparities by establishing minimum 
standards for high-impact industrial sources that would apply 
regardless of the local conditions. 
The PSD and NSR programs codified in the 1977 were spurred 
by a complex array of issues. The PSD program emerged 
originally from a suit brought by the Sierra Club, while the NSR 
program was prompted by a latent statutory ban on construction 
of major sources in nonattainment areas. Congressional concerns 
about the citing of coal-fired power plants in pristine areas of the 
west were an overriding motivation for the PSD program, 
whereas NSR was premised on protecting local air quality 
without unduly impeding economic development.279 In addition 
the PSD technology-based standards, though less stringent, also 
partially offset the NSR standards by easing potential regulatory 
imbalances between nonattainment (largely urban) and 
attainment (typically rural) areas. 
Today, neither apprehensions about local air quality nor 
concerns about regional regulatory disparities provide firm 
grounds for either program. Setting aside electric utilities,280 the 
primary reason is that industrial emissions of criteria pollutants 
have declined dramatically over the intervening years and now 
constitute a small proportion of overall emissions nationally—8 
percent of VOCs and PM2.5, 12 percent of NOx, and 14 percent of 
SO2.281 Moreover, while these percentages are national averages, 
they are broadly representative of non-utility industrial 
emissions at the county level.282 As a consequence, even with 
 
278.   See supra pp. 249-251. 
279.   See supra pp. 261-264. 
280.   Importantly, coal-fired power plants are subject to separate federal 
regulations under the SO2 and NOx trading programs, which account for most of 
the observed declines in emissions of these criteria pollutants from electric 
utilities. See supra p. 264. 
281.   By comparison, electric utilities collectively emit 66 percent of SO2, 18 
percent of NOx, 9 percent of PM2.5, and 0.24 percent of VOCs. 
282.   Even in the Houston area, which is an extreme outlier nationally with 
respect to the size and number of industrial facilities in the surrounding county, 
emissions from non-utility industrial sources in 2005 were a quarter of total 
emissions or less in all but one case—18 percent of NOx emissions, 22 percent of 
VOC emissions, 25 percent of PM2.5 emissions, and 50 percent of SO2 emissions. 
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conservative assumptions about scientific uncertainties,283 the 
risks associated with industrial facilities, including the 
likelihood of localized hotspots, are low because emissions levels 
bound the magnitude of the potential impacts.284 
The underlying intuition here is that continued federal 
regulation is not warranted when emissions from industrial 
sources reach a level that is sufficiently low, both in relative and 
absolute terms. Put differently, once industrial sources account 
for a minor share of overall emissions, neither local risks nor 
interstate transport of pollutants would justify federal 
intervention; instead, states should decide how to allocate 
emissions between sources in their jurisdiction. The implied 
preference for state regulation, which is embraced by the two 
leading theories of environmental federalism,285 derives from the 
fact that local policies can be better calibrated to reflect local 
conditions, which the EPA data show vary dramatically, and 
public values. Further, to the extent that concerns about public 
choice dynamics persist, the history of clean air policy suggests 
that pressures to reduce emissions from industrial sources will 
be as strong as, if not stronger, than those for other categories of 
sources. 
The threat of regulatory imbalances to local economic 
development is also mitigated by the modest levels of emissions 
from most industrial facilities. When industrial sources, on 
average, collectively account for less than 15 percent of the 
criteria pollutants emitted, compliance with NAAQS alone is 
 
283.   While scientific uncertainties persist, each criteria pollutant has been 
studied extensively and the available science has been subjected to extensive 
peer review. Bachmann, supra note 9, at 680-81. 
284.   Similar arguments hold for most air toxics, which typically pose greater 
concerns about localized hotspots. An earlier article of mine examines these 
issues in detail and, drawing on extensive EPA data, shows that industrial 
emissions of air toxics in the vast majority of counties and census tracts are low 
in both absolute and relative terms; the few exceptions to this rule are strongly 
associated with emissions from steel mills and foundries. Adelman, supra note 
149, at 47-48. Other factors also mitigate the risks, particularly that the most 
pervasive criteria pollutant, ozone, has a long atmospheric lifetime and is 
generated indirectly (through reactions of NOx, VOCs and sunlight), both of 
which reduce the likelihood that ozone levels will be significantly elevated 
around large sources. 
285.   See supra notes192-195 and accompanying discussion. 
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unlikely to foreclose construction (or modification) of individual 
facilities—the impacts will be de minimis, particularly given the 
uncertainties inherent to air pollution models. The observation 
that Houston, with its outsized industrial base, is among the 
fastest growing centers for large industries further undercuts 
fears about regulatory disparities redirecting economic 
development.286 This apparent insensitivity to local conditions 
may be influenced by the counterbalancing effects of the PSD 
and NSR programs, but my own sense (the econometric studies 
are mixed) is that other economic considerations dominate.287 
The stability of major industrial centers across the country is 
further evidence that regulatory disparities are of secondary 
importance. Setting aside electric utilities, many of the 
industries with the largest emissions of criteria pollutants are 
clustered in certain areas—petrochemical plants in California, 
Illinois, Louisiana, and Texas; iron and steel manufacturing in 
Pennsylvania and Alabama; and chemical manufacturing in 
Texas, Louisiana, and Illinois.288 This phenomenon is broadly 
recognized by economists as reflecting the positive spillovers 
associated with collocating businesses that lock in patterns of 
industrial development.289 The persistence of these patterns and 
 
286.   See supra Part II.D. 
287.   Numerous studies have been conducted to assess the impact of 
environmental regulations on the location of industrial facilities, including a 
number that focus on air quality issues and attainment status in particular. 
See, e.g., Smita B. Brunnermeier & Arik Levinson, Examining the Evidence on 
Environmental Regulations and Industry Location, 13 J. ENVT. DEV. 6 (2004); 
Stefan Ambec et al., The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental 
Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?, 7 REV. ENVTL. ECON. 
POL. 2 (2013); Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations 
on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1175 (2002); 
Randy A. Becker, Local Environmental Regulation and Plant-Level Product-
ivity, 70 ECOL. ECON. 2516 (2011). 
288.   MARTIN V. MELOSI, EFFLUENT AMERICA: CITIES, INDUSTRY, ENERGY, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 29 (2001) (describing how specific cities or areas became 
centers for particular industries, such as iron and steel making); STRADLING, 
supra note 36, at 10 (explaining that the high cost of shipping coal and coke 
caused energy-intensive industries to locate near productive coal mines in the 
1800s and 1900s); DEWEY, supra note 45, at 177-79. 
289.   See, e.g., Marius Brulhart, Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the 
Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials?, 122 ECON. J. 1069, 1069-70 
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their link to the positive spillovers associated with industry 
clustering provide further reason to question the value of direct 
federal regulation.290 
The NSR and the PSD programs are often separately 
championed for promoting the deployment of new 
technologies.291 While this claim has intuitive appeal, it is 
difficult to prove (the few available empirical studies are 
mixed292) and subject to countervailing considerations. First, the 
demand for better technologies would not go away in their 
absence. The NSPS program would provide a backstop, albeit 
one based on a weaker standard and more vulnerable to 
regulatory lags.293 More importantly, urban areas still struggling 
to meet the NAAQS will, if past is prologue, continue to pressure 
industrial sources to reduce their emissions; absent this added 
layer of federal regulation, they could use alternative policy 
instruments. Second, economic efficiency is undermined when 
technology and environmental policies are conflated because 
 
(2012) (concluding that agglomeration economies “can constrain the ability (and 
incentive) of jurisdictions to compete for firms via strategically low tax rates” or 
other economic incentives); Glenn Ellison et al., What Causes Industry 
Agglomeration? Evidence from Coagglomeration Patterns, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 
1195, 1195-96 (2010). 
290.   One could argue that, consistent with the legislative intent of the 1977 
Amendments, the PSD and NSR programs have enabled economic development 
in heavily industrialized areas to continue by limiting the emissions from each 
source. This may have been true for certain pollutants, notably SO2 and PM, 
and sources (coal-fired power plants) in the 1970s and 80s, but it is hard to see 
how it could be true now when industrial sources are low in absolute and 
relative terms; in short, industrial sources are not the limiting factor in the 
difficult balance that the federal government and states are trying to strike 
between economic development and air quality. 
291.   See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in 
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LESSONS AFTER 20 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 436, 437 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 
2007). 
292.   David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 
1990, 22 J. POL. ANALYSIS MGNT. 641,  655-59 (2003); Margaret R. Taylor et al., 
Control of SO2 Emissions from Power Plants: A Case of Induced Technological 
Innovation in the U.S., 72 TECH. FORECASTING SOC. CHANGE 697, 715-16 (2005). 
293.   The NSPS program operates as a floor for the stricter standards under 
the NSR and PSD programs, which avoid regulatory lags in updating control 
technologies because they are applied on a case-by-case basis. 
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each involves a distinct set of externalities.294 Thus, while the 
PSD and NSR programs may enhance demand for new 
emissions-control technologies, this should be viewed as a 
secondary benefit that, on its own, would not justify retaining 
them. 
The arguments presented in this section negate or qualify the 
conventional rationales for the PSD and NSR programs. 
However as noted earlier, coal-fired power plants and the 
Houston industrial complex are, in distinct ways, exceptions to 
the low levels of industrial emissions nationally. Both raise a 
complex set of issues, so I will merely outline how they could be 
addressed through substitute policies. Emissions of SO2 and NOx 
from electric utilities are regulated separately under two federal 
pollution trading programs, which have reduced emissions 
dramatically and are widely viewed as successful.295 Although 
currently in the process of being restructured,296 these trading 
regimes could obviate the need for the PSD and NSR 
programs.297 Alternatively, while I would favor pollution trading 
regimes, limiting the PSD and NSR programs to coal-fired power 
plants, or equivalently increasing substantially the emissions 
thresholds for triggering them, would also be a reasonable 
approach that by retaining the programs may mitigate 
 
294.   Adam Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and 
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOL. ECON. 164, 168–69 (2005) (highlighting the 
importance of innovation policies “as distinct from environmental policies 
[designed to] internaliz[e] environmental externalities”). 
295.   Bachman, supra note 9, at 56-57, 60-61, 137-38; Sam Napolitano et al., 
The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the Design, Operation, and 
Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 52 (Aug./Sept. 
2007). 
296.   Although in the second round of litigation and currently before the 
Supreme Court, EPA is continuing the process of restricting the programs 
administratively. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Case on Cross-State Pollution 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2013, at A21. It is important to note that the recent 
disruptions of these programs are not a sign of system failure, but rather more a 
product of litigation and statutory constraints. David A. Evans & Richard T. 
Woodward, Experiment? The Collapse of the National SO2 Trading Program and 
Implications for Tradable Permits as a Policy Instrument, 5 ANN. REV. 
RESOURCE ECON. 325, 341-42 (2013). 
297.   Air quality around national parks, could be addressed separately by 
retaining the enhanced protections for air quality around national parks under 
the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. § 7472, 7473, 7491 (2006). 
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opposition. 
Managing industrial emissions in the Houston area poses 
more challenging issues. One should recognize, though, that the 
PSD and NSR programs have not prevented the concentration of 
industries in the area, and may have reinforced it by 
grandfathering pre-1977 facilities.298 Further, insofar as 
evidence exists of businesses being driven outside the Houston 
area, it appears that the limiting factor is the NSR requirement 
that new (or modified) facilities offset attendant increases in 
emissions.299 Drawing on this anecdotal observation, an effective 
policy could involve basing the threshold for requiring emissions 
offsets on industrial emissions collectively exceeding an absolute 
level or a percentage of total emissions in a nonattainment area. 
This would create a better-calibrated disincentive against 
further buildup of heavily industrialize areas than the current 
NSR offset rule, which applies to all nonattainment areas 
regardless of the relative contributions of local industries. It is 
important to emphasize that this discussion is intended merely 
to illustrate the viability of alternative policies; a more complete 
treatment will have to wait for a subsequent paper. 
Finally, I want to emphasize that I would not support 
eliminating the PSD and NSR programs without reforms to 
strengthen the pollution-trading regimes for electric utilities or 
to address climate change.300 In light of the statutory limits 
exposed by pending and past litigation, most of the problems 
could be alleviated by expanding EPA’s authority to enable it to 
adapt the trading regimes to mitigate interstate air pollution. 
Similarly, it would be foolish to forego the change to regulate 
industrial greenhouse-gas emissions under the PSD program 
 
298.   The reasons for this perverse result is that new facilities and 
expansions often circumvent the PSD and NSR regulation by coming under 
grandfathered emissions caps of existing facilities. 
299.   See Mack & O’Brien Interview, supra note 216. 
300.   Alternatives to outright elimination of the programs could include the 
following: (1) cutting the long-criticized increment limits under the PSD 
program and thereby reducing it to a set of technology-based standards and 
strict limits on haze around national parks; (2) removing the offset 
requirements from the NSR program and thereby limiting it to a set of 
technology-based standards. 
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without new policies on climate change. Reforming the PSD and 
NSR programs is attractive because it would be viewed as a 
dramatic concession by environmentalists, but in practical effect 
it would have minimal environmental costs—both because the 
levels of industrial emissions are low and the NSPS program 
would be retained as a backstop. If used in the service of broader 
reforms, the political leverage would be substantial, particularly 
given the long-standing antipathy of industry advocates to the 
two programs. Moreover, while I appreciate that this proposal 
cuts against deeply held views, legislative action on issues such 
as climate change will be far less likely to occur if we fail to 




The Clean Air Act is rightly celebrated as the most successful 
federal environmental law; this Article has argued that it may 
also be the most misunderstood. The two features of the statute 
viewed as integral to its effectiveness, the NAAQS and the 
statute’s hybrid form of cooperative federal-state regulation, are 
in practice far less important than conventional views maintain. 
The NAAQS program plays a secondary role, whereas direct 
federal regulation is currently driving most improvements in air 
quality. For related reasons—the mix of overlapping programs, 
limits imposed by public and private opposition, and skewed 
distributions of emissions across source categories—state action 
is constrained or preempted with the result that cooperative 
federalism is more federal than it is cooperative. 
None of these observations detracts from the many successes 
of the law. They suggest instead that the NAAQS program must 
be reoriented to address the political and structural barriers 
distinctive to reducing emissions from smaller sources. A 
principal reason I chose to address this topic is my concern that 
the misplaced sense of action encouraged by focusing unduly on 
industrial sources has become an obstacle to addressing these 
deeper problems. The opportunities for reform discussed in the 
final section are offered in this spirit as starting points for 
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realignment of the statute and as opportunities to enable 
broader reforms to address climate change. 
 
